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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT - CONCEPTS OF WAR

by

Robert E. Orcutt, Jr.

March 1986

Thesis Advisor:

James G. Taylor

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Soviet Military Thought - Concepts of War

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Many Americans, including national policymakers and military officers, undoubtedly "mirror image" Western perspectives of the world onto their Soviet counterparts. In the military command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) area this misguided approach can lead to incorrect analysis and gross miscalculation of enemy capabilities and intentions. This thesis is an attempt to sensitize the American military officer to a sampling of those cultural and ideological asymmetries that can make Soviet approaches to war and C3I decisionmaking radically different from our own. Special emphasis is given to Soviet Marxist-Leninist views on peace, war, and military doctrine and science.

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PREFACE

The methodology followed in preparing this paper was to review a selected portion of Western writings on Soviet views of war and use these work's bibliographies as a pointer to applicable translated Soviet works. Research into Soviet texts was confined to a portion of those contained in the U.S. Air Force translated 18 volume Soviet Officer Library Series. These translations though generally excellent, inherently suffer from the same limitations and impreciseness present in any translated work. Specifically this is reflected in the tendency to translate Russian words into their nearest and often broadest English meaning. This unfortunately often results in "watered down" translations where the total impact of a word's true Russian meaning is lost on its English reader.¹

Adding to this lost meaning is the Soviet practice of publishing "sanitized" English edition or export versions that are purged of more sensitive issues that might unduly excite Western readers. The Western reader can therefore be ignorant of many warfighting principles and concepts presented to the native Russian reader.

The third and most difficult area of translation is that of imbedded contextual meaning. The Soviet Union is not only secretive because it is a closed totalitarian society, but also due to the nature of its cultural communication methods that have evolved over the centuries (see Chapter I). This peculiar cultural evolution has resulted in a society rich in context and "hidden meanings." In this setting the use of "keywords" may evoke a series of mental "action chains" or

¹For additional discussion on this problem of Russian translation see Ronald J. Tekel, Russian Language Translation in the U.S. Intelligence Community M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1986.

thought processes that are understandable only to an individual that has been raised for years under the Soviet Marxist-Leninist culture. The reliance on Western Soviet analysts of the Soviet Union has been primarily an attempt to bridge this gap, recognizing that they too may be victims.

This thesis was written for the National Security Affairs emphasis area of the Naval Postgraduate School Joint Command, Control, and Communications (C3) curriculum. This emphasis area was created to better educate U.S. C3 students into the nature of Soviet C3 and strategy. The paper is an outgrowth of an inspirational series of lectures given at the Naval Postgraduate School by Professors Robert B. Bathhurst and James G. Taylor. Many of the ideas not attributable to other sources are the product of extensive note-taking and inspiration from their courses.

I. INTRODUCTION

Command and Control (C2) has been defined as "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission."² Implicit in the exercise of this command and control function is the commander's ability to sense the nature of his own environment and assess the nature of his enemy's capabilities and intentions. This latter intelligence function cannot be confined to numerical tabulations of enemy force capabilities, but must also focus on the enemy's conceptual framework, i.e., the paradigm from which the enemy views the world and will make his decisions. This is a cornerstone to effective command in war--the ability to understand the enemy and think as he does. As the military historian and strategist Liddell Hart has said:

"the primary requirement in generalship, and in statesmanship [is] to guess what is going on behind the opposing front, and in the opponents mind . . . to look at the situation--especially your situation--from his point of view is the best way of trying to get into his mind." [Ref. 1: p.6]

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a sampling of Soviet political-ideological viewpoints that can have an impact both on Soviet decisionmaking processes and on Western attempts to deal with the Soviets. The motivation for this paper was the author's realization that during his 13 years of naval service, many American naval officers new next to nothing of the nature of their primary adversary--the Soviet Union. What was worse, these officers often assumed that American and Western views on war and peace

²This definition was extracted from Department of Defense, JCS PUB 1.

were shared by their Soviet counterparts. In some cases this led to complacency as officers assumed the Soviets would react as we would under similar circumstances. This thesis is an attempt to break this "mirror imaging" and demonstrate through presentation of selected Soviet writings, that the Soviet view of the world and peace and war is quite different from our own.

By understanding something of the Soviet's political-ideological heritage and culture we can better assess and predict Soviet intentions both on and off the battlefield. This knowledge can prepare military commanders and policymakers as to the types of decisions the enemy is likely to take when confronted with a given situation. The building of large "Spetsnaz" sabotage and assassination commando units can be properly interpreted as consistent with Soviet ideology and "objective laws of war" that mandate taking the fight to the enemy rear, i.e., his unprotected and vulnerable economic and political institutions and his decision-making centers. Once the attractiveness of this rear target is understood, the West can build suitable counters to make Soviet attainment of these objectives costly and unattractive. Conversely this same knowledge can be used to attack potential Soviet vulnerabilities and their own decision-making processes. Strategic deception can be used to mask U.S. intentions and misdirect Soviet resources. The building of the MIG-25 interceptor in anticipation of the projected, but deliberately fabricated, U.S. B-70 bomber deployment is one example of successful exploitation of Soviet decision-making at the strategic planning level. The important issue is to understand the enemy and avoid the dangers inherent in being surprised. At a minimum, knowledge of Soviet military thought can teach commanders to "expect the unexpected" and avoid the mirror imaging of Western concepts and values.

The organization of this thesis begins with an exploration into the problem of cultural stereotyping. In chapter three we review the cultural and sociological roots of the Soviet people. In chapter four we investigate Marxist-Leninist theory and how this theory has been operationalized. Chapter five seeks to discover what Soviet concepts of war are and chapter six surveys Soviet military doctrine and the "objective laws of war." We conclude in chapter seven by summarizing the impact of these Soviet viewpoints on selected aspects of U.S. national security.

II. PERCEPTIONS OF CULTURE

A. MIRROR IMAGING

One cannot begin to discuss (much less write about) a different culture without first recognizing that there are problems of perception and perspective that come from being imbedded in one's own culture. This most often manifests itself in the tendency to "mirror image" events and traits of another people in a manner understandable from one's own cultural framework. The bias inherent in this misguided approach can lead to complacent and self-serving interpretations of events that have quite different meanings in other cultures..

On the military side this can result in intelligence failures concerning enemy intentions that can lead to disasters of the magnitude of an Operation Barbarossa or a Pearl Harbor. Failure to properly assess and anticipate Soviet actions can lead to surprise--and with this the accompanying dangers of Western inaction or over-reaction. This was demonstrated in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then President Carter's (and by implication the U.S. intelligence services') incredulity that the Soviets would undertake such an overtly aggressive action (especially during Christmas!). The net result was U.S. and Western inaction to deter or subsequently deal with the Soviet invasion. A similar series of American (and Soviet) misperceptions led to the Cuban missile crisis of 1963 and the resulting risk of nuclear war. Had the U.S. better understood the Marxist-Leninist penchant to seize and maintain even the slightest political advantage, it may have earlier questioned Soviet ambassador Dobrynin's denials of Cuban missile emplacement. In this case surprise led to a strong U.S. military response that could have led to war if the Soviets had not backed down.

On the military-technical side, the Soviet's construction of an aircraft carrier has led many analysts to assume they will employ this asset as the American Navy has employed its carriers. This may not only be a wrong conclusion but it may lead to incorrect planning and costly misdirection of resources toward a suitable counter.

In the convoluted world of American politics, commercial communications media, and government there is a seemingly incessant drive to see things in terms Americans can deal with. Americans appreciate, indeed insist that other cultures have American like qualities they can understand and empathize with. Some authors have written extensively on this "convergence" mentality--"Americans sometimes seem to hold the view that the corollary of friendliness is identity, or at least similarity." [Ref. 2: p.11] The danger of this view is that it ignores genuine unavoidable differences in cultural outlook which if properly understood could lead to less miscalculation and better mutual understanding.

Richard Pines has attributed this convergence mentality to the commercial-liberal orientation of Americans who unconsciously assume all foreigners aspire to American-like affluence and lifestyle. This results in:

a strong distaste for any sustained analysis of foreign civilizations because such analysis might (indeed, most certainly would) demand recognition of permanent cultural pluralities and this call for an effort at learning and imagination is not required by its more comforting alternative. [Ref. 3: p.65]

As we shall discover, the Soviets reject any notion of convergence insisting that Marxist-Leninist interpretation of "objective laws" can lead to discovery of Truth. If Truth be known, why compromise or dilute its significance?

B. CONTEXT AND MEANING IN CULTURE

Edward T. Hall in his book Beyond Culture³ has attempted to address this issue of "mirror imaging" from the anthropologist's perspective. He has categorized cultures as being of two main types--high context or low context. In addition he has observed two different cultural perceptions of time--the monochronic and the polychronic. A short discussion of each of these may help to break the reader of any remaining "they're just like the folks back home" syndrome.

1. Time in Cultural Perception

a. Monochronic Time

The Swiss, German, and American societies typify the monochronic culture's penchant for time scheduling, promptness, and doing "one thing at a time". Life is viewed as a linear progression where detailed knowledge is valued more than a holistic approach. The orderly life is valued with time being saved, spent, accelerated, lost, or wasted. A criticism of monochronic peoples (from the polychronic's perspective) is that this highly structured view of time is not natural to the human condition but is imposed, learned behavior. It has the tendency to isolate the individual from the wholeness of human nature and the world. More subtly, monochronic cultures tend to think in segmented compartments and deny the importance of context in relationships. Monochronic peoples may therefore lose sight of the underlying meanings behind events. [Ref. 4: pp.10-24]

b. Polychronic Time

By contrast the cultures of Latin America, the Mediterranean, and Japan have a polychronic view of time. These cultures view life as a multi-level process in time rather than a segmented linear path. Polychronic time is

³The following analysis of culture is based largely on Beyond Culture, by Edward T. Hall, Anchor Books, 1981.

less tangible than monochronic with the event or transaction itself considered more important than its end product. Nothing is firm in a polychronic world, there are always changes at the last minute. One by-product of the polychronic culture is the tendency to rely heavily on a "headman" to coordinate their culture's otherwise disorganized efforts. This centralization of control increases as demands and functions increase. [Ref. 4: pp.10-24]

Monochronic people who visit polychronic cultures often depart very distraught and frustrated over what they interpret as a general tardiness and disorganization of effort. Polychronic visitors however are amazed to see how regimented, controlled, and stressed monochronic societies are. These different approaches to time are best exemplified by the markedly different operating philosophies of the German and Italian railroad systems. German trains depart on schedule with or without passengers and are world renown for their punctuality. On the other hand Italian trains will strive to "deliver the goods" though often hours or even days late. There are advantages, of course, to each system and a personal preference for one is probably based largely on cultural upbringing. The key is to be aware of the different cultural perceptions of time and gauge one's response and interpretation of events accordingly.

2. Context in Culture

Polychronic cultures also tend to be high context (HC). The "group" is preeminent in high context cultures and simple interpersonal messages are often high in contextual hidden meanings. These meanings, hidden from the casual observer, require considerable "programming" of individuals. This typically occurs as the individual grows up in a society. There develops a magnified sense of group identity and ego. A distinction exists between "insiders" who understand and "outsiders" who do not. Stability and continuity

are prized and authority--the "headman" is held accountable for all lower level actions. In low context (LC) cultures the individual is emphasized over the group. Innovation is encouraged usually at the expense of having a somewhat fragmented and alienated culture. Communications between individuals is explicit with little hidden meaning. There is constant movement and pressure for change vice stability. Agreements and commitments between individuals must often be enforced by law. [Ref. 4: pp. 53-167]

High context cultures then tend to be polychronic while low context are generally monochronic. Figure (1) depicts the context and information exchange relationships as a function of high context (HC) or low context (LC) culture [Ref. 4: p.102].




Figure 2.1 Context, Information, and Meaning

An American taking part in a formal Japanese tea party becomes anxious and bored over what he perceives as an overly long and drawn-out procedure for merely serving tea. He wants to be served, drink, and get on with his schedule. He is oblivious to the "hidden meanings" and messages being communicated in this centuries old ritual. An American having dealt with Japanese culture will immediately recognize the cultural asymmetry just presented. For us the Japanese typify the "inscrutable" oriental and they can often seem like two different people--one time cool and

officials, the next uncomfortably close and friendly. The above asymmetries can now be understood for what they truly are--the meetings of two vastly different cultural systems and values.

C. CONTEXT IN SOVIET CULTURE

The above cultural classification methodology may assist in better understanding Soviet Russian culture. The Soviet culture is a unique in that it combines both monochronic and polychronic views of time with a high context view of the world. We will see that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is a highly structured and deterministic philosophy that contains nearly every classic ingredient of a monochronic culture. This philosophy is superimposed onto an historic Russian culture that embodies much of the polychronic outlook. The sociology of Russia prior to 1917 (see Chapter III) shows a culture with a high degree of people involvement in the village governing body or mir, the princely courts, etc. Transactions such as the mir's annual land apportionment were heavily dependent on personal interactions and the involvement of a "headman"--the chief elder (see page 32-33). This high context culture continues under communism where the "proper connections" and unwritten behavior codes dominate social behavior.

The introduction of a Western Anglo-German inspired philosophy--Marxism--in the midst of a semi-oriental polychronic high context state was bound to prove traumatic for more than just the Tsarist ruling circles. Perhaps in recognition of this Karl Marx felt his ideas better suited to a low context Germany or England. The need for Lenin to tailor Marxist teachings (Leninism--see Chapter IV) to the situation found in Russia was probably a realization that modifications had to be made. The severe bloodletting and widespread use of state terrorism during the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) and the forced collectivization years can be

interpreted as the resistance of a polychronic people to an alien monochronic way of doing business. In any event Soviet Russian society is unique in that it represents a high context culture that utilizes an official communist monochronic philosophy to govern an essentially polychronic people.

The cultural schizophrenia brought on by the merging of these widely different cultural perspectives may account for the duality of character so often observed and written about on the Russian people.⁴ It may be one explanation for the widespread incidence of alcohol as an escape mechanism from the stresses and strains brought on by this mix of cultures.

1. Context in Soviet Military Thought

The application of the above cultural viewpoints to Soviet Military thought is equally interesting. Whereas Western approaches to warfare emphasize the initiative and genius of the individual commander as being decisive, in Warsaw Pact countries the emphasis is on control--the commander's control of battle plan formulation in minute detail and his control of the battle process. Soviet military commanders are faced with indoctrinating an essentially polychronic soldier into the unmistakably monochronic nature of modern warfare. Perhaps the memories of how well the low context, monochronic German war machine operated in World War II serves as a frightening reminder of the potential capabilities of their primarily low context NATO adversaries' fighting potential. It certainly seems that the heavy emphasis on planning and indoctrination and the Soviet Communist Party's (CPSU) drive to create "the new Soviet man" is in fact a quest to create a monochronic citizen that will better achieve and adapt to the deterministic goals of Marxism-Leninism.

⁴For one author's viewpoint see Hedrick Smith, The Russians, N.Y. Times Book Co., 1976.

The high context nature of Soviet society has allowed Soviet views on war and the resulting military strategy to develop in a manner that is quite alien to the low context West. The Soviets do not confine their view of warfare to its military-political context but (properly in this author's view) see it as a struggle across the spectrum of human social experience (see Chapter V). This portends grave consequences for a Western culture ignorant and complacent of this fact.

Perhaps the greatest potential impact of a Russian "high context" outlook are the implications this holds for Western intelligence. As previously noted, in a high context society "hidden meanings" convey much of what would, in a low context culture, have to be spoken or otherwise communicated. As much of Western intelligence is based on analysis of written Soviet products, this high context viewpoint permits Soviet authors to preserve secrecy through use of an elaborate "code" language:

Frequently books that contain the latest views on the future are cast within a historical context that obscures their importance to Westerners (but not to Soviets). [Ref. 5: p.14]

Other Soviet analysts note the Soviet tendency to illustrate concepts by way of reference to Western military ideas though they undoubtedly ascribe to these concepts themselves.

This use of hidden context allows Soviets to "get the word out" and explain the latest official Party views on the nature of war, military science, military doctrine, etc. by masking them through reference to historical or Western practices.

D. SUMMARY

This paper will explore Soviet military thought and hopefully avoid problems of "mirror-imaging". The asymmetries observed between Soviet and American thinking should be understood keeping in mind the different cultural frameworks the two societies operate from. To arbitrarily ascribe fanciful similarities between Soviet and American systems in the hope of promoting a common identity or basis for mutual understanding is nothing more than intellectual prostitution. The Soviet world outlook is quite different from ours and is solidly based in Russian culture and Soviet philosophy. We must recognize these differences and acknowledge that some areas are potentially irreconcilable. Understanding the Soviet cultural paradigm can prove the key in understanding and predicting future Soviet strategies.

III. SOVIET STRATEGIC HERITAGE

A. GEOGRAPHY

Soviet Russian geography is best understood by viewing it in the context of the greater Eurasian landmass. To the south of the Soviet Union lie a series of great mountain ranges--the Carpathians, the Caucasus, and the Himilayas. These mountains effectively isolate the Soviet Union from the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Indian subcontinent. To the north are the Arctic Ocean and tundra regions. East are the historically hostile China and Japan and to the west an equally unfriendly Europe. In the middle is the Soviet Union, stretching almost halfway around the world through 11 time zones and covering 17% of the earth's inhabited surface. The USSR is more than twice as large as the United States and Alaska combined. One peculiarity of the vast Soviet landmass is that despite having over 28,000 miles of coastline there exists only one year around ice free ocean port--Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean. Other coastal ports are ice bound for significant periods and sea traffic must also negotiate potentially hostile straits. [Ref. 6: p. 9]

The river systems of the USSR are no less unique. The rivers of Siberia virtually all flow northward into the Arctic thus making them nearly useless as commercial transportation routes. In western Russia, west of the Ural mountains, the three major river systems--the Don, the Dnieper, and the Volga all flow south and only the Dnieper and Volga into seas--the Black Sea and the landlocked Caspian Sea respectively. Historically these latter rivers have served as the major Russian trade routes both in summer and when frozen in winter. Their north-south orientation however has tended to restrict trade with the West to the major Baltic

and Black Sea ports even after the advent of the railroad.
[Ref. 7: pp.5-10]

The more strategic and important part of both modern and historic Russia is centered in European Russia, specifically the area west of the Urals. This area is part of the Greater Russian Plain, a geographic mass which extends 3000 miles from central Siberia to the Baltic and 2500 miles from the Caucasus to the Arctic. In the area between the Volga and Dnieper rivers are 250 million acres of tillable rich black soil called "chernozem" [Ref. 6: p.99]. It is this vast expanse of fertile land that has served to draw the many centuries of invaders that have made up Russia's history.

B. CLIMATE

The climate of the central Russian Plain is characterized by its extremes of summer heat without rain and long intense winters with snow. The interior continental position coupled with the lack of any moderating ocean influences is the primary cause for this condition. By contrast the American Great Plains, though suffering similar temperature extremes, enjoys the moderating influence of summer moisture-laden Gulf of Mexico winds. The resultant impact on agricultural production is dramatic. While nearly 60% of the United States is tillable, only about 25% of the Soviet Union supports agriculture. Poland and Germany on the western reaches of this same plain reap some benefits of the Atlantic, but the combination of distance and prevailing northwesterly winds mean that the central Russian "bread-basket" often experiences drought--typically once in 5 years. [Ref. 7: pp.5-10]

C. IMPACT OF INVASION

The other adverse influence brought on by Russian geography has been the long history of invasion. While the civilizations of Greece and Rome developed under the relative

protection of geographic barriers of mountains and sea, the unbroken Russian Plain has invited centuries of invasion from the East and West. Figure 3.1 is a partial listing of those wars and invasions Russia has undergone since ancient times.

Cimmereans	1000 - 700 B.C.
Scythians	700 - 200 B.C.
Sarmations	200 B.C. - 200 A.D.
Greeks	600 B.C. - 600 A.D.
Goths	200 - 370 A.D.
Huns	370 - 558 A.D.
Avars	558 - 650 A.D.
Khazars	650 - 737 A.D.
Slavs	500 B.C. - 737 A.D.
Swedes	737 - 839 A.D.
Magyars	840 - 858 A.D.
Danes	858 - 878 A.D.
Teutonic Knights	1225 - 1237
Lithuania	1202 - 1386
Mongols	1240 - 1480
Poland	1558 - 1618
Sweden	1581 - 1618
	1707 - 1709
	1741 - 1743
Turkey	1768 - 1772
France	1812
Britain/France (Crimea)	1853 - 1855
Turkey	1877
Japan	1901 - 1905
Germany/Austria	1915 - 1918
Western Intervention (WWI)	1917 - 1918
Poland	1920
Finland	1939 - 1940
Germany (WWII)	1940 - 1945

Figure 3.1 Wars and Invasions of Russia

1. Origins of the Russian State

The original native people of the Great Russian Plain between the Don and the Dnieper were primarily an agricultural people. These people were conquered and intermixed with by successive generations of Asian nomadic tribes driven west by other nomadic tribes or lured to the central Russian Plain by more abundant pastureland and food. These tribes of Iranian, Turkic, and Mongolian blood were

characterized by the use of cavalry and by the military-feudal rule they imposed on the conquered. Until A.D. 826 the primary cultural influences in Russia were a blend of the oriental and western, with western contact being limited to Greek and later Roman trading colonies on the Black Sea littoral. Noteworthy here is the "scorched earth" military tactic first utilized by the Scythians against the invading Persian King Darius in 512 B.C. and latter used extensively by other Russians in protection of the motherland. [Ref. 8: pp.1-13]

Present day Russians trace their origins to the Slavic tribes that arrived in central Russia (probably from central Europe) beginning around the 5th century A.D. These tribes broke into three main groupings--the southern Slavs comprising modern day Bulgarians, the western Slavs ancestors of today's Czechs, and the eastern Slavs later called Russians. Like their nomadic predecessors, they too freely intermarried with the local populace which by this time had also been infused with German blood from the Gothic invasions of 200-370 A.D. This Slavic population was essentially agricultural with a strong family and communal orientation:

In early documents these Old-Slavonic plowmen are described as peaceful, moderate, mild and humane, patient and sober, disinterested in power, hardworking, living in social and political democracy. [Ref. 9: p.32]

They were largely self-governing and owed allegiance to the prince of the nearby city-state. [Ref. 8: pp.6-9]

The first Russian state evolved from the collapse of the oriental Khazar Empire and the subsequent invasion by Scandinavian Norsemen or Vikings some of whom called themselves "Rus". The first Rus ruler was Rurik (862-879) who divided his conquered territories into principalities

governed by his three sons. The Rurik dynasty which governed Russia from 862 until 1598 was characterized by feudal rule and division of hereditary territories into numerous principalities chief among which was the city-state of Kiev. [Ref. 8: pp.13-40]

2. Impact of Mongol Invasion

These divisions, lack of centralized authority, and the resultant military weakness became apparent when the Mongols or Tartars of central Asia easily invaded and subsequently dominated Russia from 1240 until 1480. This Mongol period stands as one of the most influential periods in Russian history. In the words of one historian:

Not only were there territorial alterations, but the physical and mental characteristics of the people were transformed to an almost unbelievable extent, so that the break between Russian culture and Western culture became complete. [Ref. 10: p.23]

Into the semi-stable conditions of the Slavic agricultural population was introduced a 250 year period of domination by a nomadic people with quite different sociological and philosophic traits. The nomads of central Asia had personal traits of ". . . self-orientation and self-aggrandizement at the expense of others" and were governed by ". . . the traditional philosophy of the steppe warriors which tells them that might is right and only unchallenged power imposed by fear and awe brings personal satisfaction and security." [Ref. 9: pp.27,42] It was these motivations which fueled the incessant Mongol drive for new conquests.

The psychological impact of the Mongol invasion can be seen in the radical changes occurring in Slavic folk epics of this period. The formerly helpful and benevolent spirits of the "Old-Slavonic" times became transformed into gruesome demons ". . . blood-sucking vampires, heart-devouring witches . . . similar to those found in the

underworld of the steppe nomads" [Ref. 9: p.52] The old Slavonic social order was completely disrupted and a new climate of doom and gloom permeated Russian society. A number of Russian princes of this period were either outright killed or fled west to Polish and Lithuanian kingdoms. An even more significant number, however, became adaptive to their new Tartar overlords. These Russian princes found Tartar administrative and governing methods well suited to their own personal desires for aggrandizement and power. Tartar systems of taxation, transportation, postal service, and military organization were introduced. Tartar "trust" for these accommodating principalities extended to the point where Tartar tax collectors were replaced by Russians and Russian regiments were actively utilized in the 13th century Mongol conquest of China [Ref. 8: p.61]. The prince who could offer the most taxes and tribute to the Khan was rewarded with a "yarlyk" or charter of privileges that greatly expanded both his personal wealth and territory. The end product of this process was the rise of a few extremely powerful princes at the expense of weaker princes and their own overtaxed population. [Ref. 8: pp.55-70]

D. THE RISE OF MOSCOW

Prince Ivan Kalita of Moscow (Ivan I, 1325-1341) was very adept at securing these yarlyk and greatly expanded his principedom by systematically attacking those princes that were resistant to either Tartar or Moscow hegemony. The Moscow princes and aristocracy also adopted the Tartar practice of collecting taxes at the communal village vice individual level. This practice proved very important in Russian history as it is credited with giving further impetus to the rise of the village governing group or the "mir" (see pages 32-33). Alliances with Mongol chieftains were often sealed through matrimony. It has been estimated

that even by the end of the 17th century, 17% of Moscow's aristocracy was of Tartar or oriental origin [Ref. 8: p.63].

1. Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church

The Orthodox church also aided greatly in the rise of Moscow as the chief Russian principality. Under Vladimir I of Kiev (978-1015) the Christian practices of the Constantinople based Byzantium church had been introduced into Russia in 988 A.D. When the great schism between the Byzantium and Rome based Latin church occurred in 1054 the Eastern church viewed the Byzantine emperor as successor to the Roman caesars and the only true guardian of the Christian faith. In this scheme the church evolved into a decidedly inferior position that recognized the temporal and spiritual leadership of the Emperor. As the Constantinople Patriarch wrote in 1393:

it is impossible for Christians to have a church and not have a Tsar because the church and the state are in a close alliance and interaction and it is impossible to separate one from the other. [Ref. 8: p.140]

When Vladimir I sought to choose a state religion the Byzantine church offered the greatest degree of secular control. The Russian church and its metropolitan remained in Kiev until the rapid ascendancy of Moscow showed that the church could better spread the faith and gain in wealth by aligning itself with Moscow. This relationship proved a further impetus to Moscow's ambitions which were now justified by church-backed claims of the divine origin of princely powers. The church also allowed the Moscow prince use of the power of excommunication to control his adversaries [Ref. 8: p.164]. The dependency of the Moscow based church on the Moscow Prince became nearly total with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453. With the blessing of the newly established patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Prince of Moscow decreed Moscow as the

new "Third Rome" and himself as the new Caesar or Tsar.
[Ref. 10: pp.40-64]

2. Political Impact of the Byzantine Tradition

The Russian Orthodox Church was quite different from the Rome based church as it developed a political and religious Orthodoxy that combined Russian, Mongol, and Byzantine beliefs. These beliefs recognized the Tsar as deriving authority directly and exclusively from God ". . . the Tsar alone possessed rights, his subjects only duties." [Ref. 9: p.60] Church teachings depict an angry and revengeful God that probably closely approximates the character of the Mongol and Russian princes. To survive under these circumstances the church taught complete submissiveness--"Faith and blind obedience were declared to be the sole road to salvation . . ." and ". . . manifestations of independent thought was heresy and blasphemy." [Ref. 8: p.166]

The Russian Church remained subordinate to the state in both secular and ecclesiastical matters under the Tsars. The near theocratic rule of the Moscow Tsars served to greatly increase their power while the church gained in protection and wealth. The Russian Church never developed into a second seat of power that could balance or at least moderate the growing despotic rule of Moscow. Instead, following in the Byzantine tradition, the church became a loyal supporter of Moscow absolutism. The social impact of this was enormous. Under an increasingly oppressive rule aestheticism and apocalyptic thinking came to dominate much of Russian life. Monastic orders and hermitism flourished as individuals sought escape. Those who did not withdraw developed a self-protective fatalistic resignation to the world around them. This apolitical and apathetic behavior served to heighten the already absolute power of the Tsar.
[Ref. 9: pp.40-64]

3. The Decline of Russian Aristocracy

In the face of growing Tsarist power political impotence was not confined merely to the lower social classes. Beginning with Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible, 1533-1584) a systematic effort was undertaken to weaken the power of the aristocracy or boyars. Prior to this period Russian aristocracy was based on patrimony or the transferring of hereditary properties from generation to generation. Using a combination of cunning, deceit, and outright terror, Ivan IV gradually changed this hereditary right into a system of land grants based on service to the crown. This had two far reaching implications. First was the consolidation and unification under Ivan IV and his successors of the many principalities that made up most of Russia. Second was the elimination of other weaker princes and the aristocracy as competing sources of power. Now required to render service and loyalty to the Tsar to gain or retain landholdings, the boyar class measured individual power by their proximity to and influence with the Tsar. Intense boyar rivalries and palace intrigues resulted which the Tsars skillfully used to further control and manipulate the Russian nobility. This aristocracy never effectively developed as a potential check against monarchical absolutism as occurred in England with Charles I and the Magna Carta. Instead, the Russian boyars became distracted in internecine struggles and power plays. The product again was increased territory, wealth, and power for the Tsar. [Ref. 8: pp.182-208]

E. RUSSIAN SOCIETY

Russian society prior to 1917 consisted primarily of the two classes already mentioned--the aristocracy and the clergy--and also the peasantry and the bureaucracy. The peasantry comprised an estimated 95% of the total population. The middle class and the working classes were very small. The bureaucracy while also very small played a role in Russia disproportionate to its size.

1. Russian Peasantry and the Village "Mir"

Living in villages remote from their overlords, the peasantry evolved a system of governing unique to their environment and conditions. Scratch and burn agricultural methods and the severe climatic conditions already described made bare survival a tenuous situation with food production typically at the subsistence level. In this situation there evolved a heavy dependence of people on each other with survival being ensured only by group and not individual effort. Under these conditions the village governing group of elders called the "mir" grew in power and influence. The mir was comprised of the eldest propertied male from each village family and was headed by an elected chief elder. The central principle of operation was to ensure that all village lands were always under production. The village as a whole owned the land, but each male had a right to his equal share which was taxable. This system of land distribution was the same for peasant owned land, for peasant tenants on estates, and for serfs.

The total meaning conveyed by the word "mir" is difficult to convey in English. It means both commune, land, earth, and cosmos and its use by Russian peasantry conveyed a sense of community tradition, duty, power, and sacredness [Ref. 11: pp.348-349]. The mir elders were a very conservative group that generally opposed innovation as subsistence living meant minimal risk taking. Peasants subordinate to the mir were likewise resistant to changes in the "successful" status quo. Assemblies of the elders were characterized by a period of discussion, resolution, and voting, usually by acclamation. The minority always submitted as unanimity in mir decisions was an unwritten law. One observer of the period wrote:

I know of many instances where peasants have set at defiance the authority of the police, of the provincial governor, and of the central government itself, but I

have never heard of any instance where the will of the mir was openly opposed by one of its members. [Ref. 11: p. 419]

The independence from outside authority alluded to in this passage was a function of the secrecy the mir could command from its members. Villages were typically very secretive lest their hidden resources of wealth become an invitation to attack from outsiders. This perceived threat came not only from nomadic warriors but also from nearby villages and boyars. In this scheme the chief elder became the sole spokesman for the mir and its only link to the outside world.

2. Russian Bureaucracy

As previously mentioned Ivan IV was primarily responsible for eroding the power of the Russian aristocracy. By decree in 1556 military service became obligatory for all who wished to gain or retain landholdings. The length of service required was indefinite--from age 15 until death or incapacitation. These service people or class became known as the Dvoriane and evolved into the new Russian nobility of the 17th and 18th centuries. Because landholdings were no longer hereditary it behoved Dvoriane children to also enter government service. This service was open to all classes of people and the Dvoriane quickly became populated by all types of persons from aristocrats to former peasants. The amount of land awarded for military service varied greatly with the high ranking officers receiving both vast landgrants and nobility status. Even the lowest ranking Dvoriane, however, could expect to obtain one peasant household and an associated parcel of land that could support him while in the service of the Tsar. The middle and lower ranking Dvoriane were found throughout Russia while the highest ranking generally concentrated in Moscow near the source of power. Here they competed with and

gradually displaced the "ancient" Boyar aristocracy as the chief force in government affairs. The Dvoriane became an important social force in Russian history and more importantly established government service as a prerequisite to achieving wealth, power, and status.

Peter I (Peter the Great, 1682-1725) attempted much administrative reform, most aimed at decentralizing the central Moscow bureaucracy's increasingly lethargic stranglehold over Russian affairs. The Dvoriane had absorbed much of the Tsar's discretionary landholdings so Tsar Peter sought to remove this financial drain while simultaneously providing for a bureaucracy more responsive to his control. The result of these efforts was a new system of government officials, the Chinovnichestvo, who were rewarded not with land but with a salary. Because the old Boyar class and the Dvoriane were illiterate ⁵ Peter I was forced to turn to two main sources- the clergy and foreigners--to obtain these new bureaucratic recruits.

Educated in Orthodox seminaries, the clergy and their children were literate but more significantly thoroughly indoctrinated in the absolute Byzantine traditions of the Russian church. This class became a natural ally and supporter of Tsarist autocracy. Peter I also imported large numbers of experienced foreign bureaucrats into Russia. ⁶ This influx of new blood initially broke the inertia of the old bureaucracy and was responsible for many of Peter I's reforms. As time and Peter I passed, however, this group and its descendants soon realized that their position and influence also depended on the well-being of a centralized Moscow bureaucracy. [Ref. 9: pp.53-86]

⁵Even by the end of the 19th century in provincial governments 80 out of 100 employees had no schooling whatsoever [Ref. 9: .]p.72

⁶In 1717 alone 148 Germans and an unspecified number of Swedish prisoners of war were introduced into the middle and upper echelons of the Moscow bureaucracy [Ref. 8: .]p.375

3. The Drive Towards Centralization

The new Chinovnichestvo gradually displaced the Dvoriane and was firmly in control of the bureaucracy by the start of the 19th century. Heavily dependent upon the Tsar, this class became even more accommodating and subservient to the wishes of the autocrat. A complimentary relationship developed wherein this new bureaucratic class sought to further centralize and consolidate power in the Moscow ministries and thus increase the control and power of its Tsarist benefactor. This Moscow bureaucracy aimed to perpetuate and preserve its centralized control and was reluctant to share any power at the local level. The civic history of 18th and 19th century Russia is in part a series of contests between this central bureaucracy and the Dvoriane dominated local governments or Zemstovos.

The philosophy that developed under this bureaucratic domination of an autocratic government was that institutions existed to guide life and not visa versa. What mattered was following orders from above. Obedience rather than ability became the criteria for promotion. Reforms undertaken were always initiated from above and input was seldom solicited from either the people or from local governments. Personal humility and self-abasement towards superiors insured job security. Careerism flourished at the expense of initiative and originality. [Ref. -: p.72]

The outgrowth of a rigid bureaucratic caste was an inherently inflexible government that looked inward and insulated itself from political reality. This structure proved incapable of dealing with the rapidly changing events and revolutionary new political ideas of the 19th century. This ineptitude was demonstrated in the continuing series of peasant rebellions that plagued much of Russia during the 18th and 19th centuries. An interesting paradox is that elements of this same bureaucratic caste gave rise to the

intellectual dissident and revolutionary movements that eventually toppled the Tsarist autocracy.

F. SUMMARY

The Russians have historically viewed the world and their environment as hostile. Nature has been an adversary and not a friend. Life is an incessant struggle and for the majority of Russian history this has meant subsistence living with few opportunities to innovate or experiment with new ideas. The struggle for survival has made people depend heavily on each other. This in turn has led to the establishment of governing methods weighted in favor of strong, autocratic leadership. The village mir with its autocratic and secretive ruling group of elders functioned as the lowest governing element. An elected chief elder presided over an oligarchical group of male peasant landowners who ruled on the basis of collective consensus and unanimity in decisions. This chief elder also served as the otherwise secretive village's only link to the outside world. The key to individual survival in this structure was "blending in" and unanimity in decisionmaking. Those who failed to adhere to collective decisions were exiled from the village to near certain death in the violent and hostile outside world.

The Russian boyar or landed aristocracy was greatly affected by two primary influences--the Russian Orthodox Church and the Tartars. The Tartars helped the Moscow princes to consolidate and expand their power following traditional Mongol practices of political expediency, deception and ruthless use of brute force. The chief Moscow prince or Tsar that emerged from the struggles of this period governed in an intensely despotic and repressive manner similar to his Tartar predecessors. Fear and intimidation were openly acknowledged as the cornerstone to effective rule. The Church accelerated this drive towards

absolutism by acknowledging the Tsar's preeminence in both secular and worldly affairs. It favorably compared his revengeful and wrathlike behavior to that of God. The Church also proclaimed itself the only true Christian faith with the Tsar as its protector. The Orthodox Church effectively isolated itself and "Holy Russia" from the "heretical" ways of the western Rome based Latin Church. This left Russia untouched by the Humanistic, Renaissance, Reformation, and other revolutionary movements affecting the rest of Europe.⁷ The result was a society fully indoctrinated and accepting of Tsarist autocratic rule.

The Tsars established policies that eliminated any competing sources of power and made the bureaucracy heavily dependent and supportive of centralized autocratic rule. Government service became a prerequisite to gaining wealth or influence. An individual's power was determined not by his government function or role but by his "connections" and status with the powers to be. All power was derived from the central government. Moscow became the "center" and Moscow "connections" the key to influence.

G. CONCLUSIONS - THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEGACY

Political culture is a peoples perception of how they should be governed and determines how they view the outside world. The Russian people share a heritage that is remarkable for its historically consistent authoritarian nature and its contrast with Western political traditions. Today's Soviet political culture shares many of the same traits as those seen in Tsarist times. In some cases this identity has been an attempt by Soviet leaders to build upon and gain legitimacy from the older Russian legacy.

⁷Learning Latin, the universal language of education and knowledge, was considered sinful by the Orthodox church of this period [Ref. 9: p.69].

1. The New Marxist Orthodoxy

Perhaps the most interesting Soviet parallel with the Tsarist past is the supplanting of the Russian Church and Orthodox faith by "the Party" and Marxism-Leninism. Just as the Tsarist autocracy relied heavily on its "divine origin" as a basis for legitimacy, the Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) has sought to evoke a religious spirit of self-sacrifice and acceptance for the greater purposes of the Revolution. Dinko Tomasic in his study of Russian cultural impact on Soviet Communism^{*} recognizes a pervading and continuing theme of guilt that is evoked by both Orthodox and CPSU teachings. For the Tsarist peasant obedience and subordination to the Tsarist "father" were the cornerstone to personal salvation and a place in heaven. For the modern Soviet self-sacrifice and compliance with the dictates of the Party are likewise justified as necessary to achieve the equally mythical goals of world socialism. The similarity in religious tone and reverence is unmistakable.

Like the Orthodox Church, the CPSU has developed a sophisticated liturgy that sanctifies the domineering and often ruthless conduct of Party leadership. The Party's great leader or "vozhd" is virtually deified and his pronouncements are considered infallible. This promotion of religious-like qualities is clearly evident in the following passage from Pravada:

Lenin's thoughts represent a superior achievement of the Russian and the world culture; an eternally living and eternally developing science of society--a fighting banner of the working class--living soul of the Bolshevik Party which led our fatherland to the avant-garde of the whole human kind.

The books of the vozhd and teacher are immortal. They live and will live eternally. Yes, Lenin lives, his spirit is immortal--his idea is eternal--the leaves of his wonder books are imperishable. [Ref. 9: p.207]

^{*}Dinko Tomasic's study is entitled The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, The Free Press, 1953.

This worship of the "Great Leader" is transferred onto the living Party leadership who share similar god-like qualities. Like the Tsars they are portrayed as benevolent towards those who submit and wrathful and merciless towards those who disobey.

The CPSU and its General Secretary thus become the modern version of Church and Tsar and have achieved near identical roles in the social and psychological development of modern Russia. The xenophobia, narrow-mindedness, and arrogance of the Russian Orthodox "Third Rome" is thus perpetuated in the ideology of the modern Soviet state. The result is the same--an uncontested political elite with one view of Truth.

2. Politburo--Successor to the Princely Court

Another intriguing parallel is the similarity between the CPSU political bureau or politburo and the traditions of the Boyar princely court. The politburo is a secretive group of men hand picked by the General Secretary, though in theory they are formally appointed by the CPSU Central Committee. Just as the individual boyar's power was measured by his proximity and access to the Tsar so also do present day politburo members stay in power primarily with the blessing of the General Secretary. Though this power seems to have declined with the advent of post-Stalinist collective leadership, it appears that General Secretary Gorbachev has reasserted this leadership role in his recent politburo membership changes. The internal "bickering" and "mafia-like" intrigues that characterized the Tsarist princely court are evidently still present if we trust the memoirs of Khrushchev.* It certainly helps to explain the meteoric rise and fall of some politburo members.

*For more on the inner workings of the politburo see Khrushchev, N., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott, 1974.

While little detail is known of the operating procedures or mechanism of this group, what is known is a system remarkably like that of the village mir. Policy items are introduced, a period of discussion follows, a consensus develops, and a resolution is voted on. Though voting is not always unanimous, minority acceptance of the majority position is mandatory.

Another parallel is that the politburo will often issue pronouncements in the name of an incapacitated General Secretary, e.g., Andropov and Chernenko. An identical policy was followed by the ruling council of boyars for young or incapacitated Tsars. The intent--to preserve the semblance of regime stability and continuity--is the same. Though there are many other similarities between the two systems what is clearly unmistakable is the identical preoccupation with political control and concentration of power as primary governing themes.

A political culture has thus developed that is nearly as alien to our own European derived traditions as that of China or Japan. For this reason, the introduction into Russia of alien European revolutionary concepts of nationalism, liberalism, and democracy as a product of Russia's participation in the 19th century Napoleonic wars was a rude shock to a culture based on 14th century oriental concepts of rule. This and the isolation and intransigence of the ruling elite spelled disaster for the old social order. It was inevitable, however, that any new social and political milieu would be strongly influenced by and gravitate toward the autocratic nature that is Russia's heritage.

IV. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS

They changed the meaning of words to justify their own acts.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War

A. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF HISTORY--HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

Marxist-Leninists view history as governed essentially by the economic relationships in societies. Economic relationships form the substructure or foundation upon which all human experience is based. Social institutions and values such as truth, justice, ethics, and laws form the non-economic, subservient superstructure of the human social relationship. History when "properly" viewed in this context is an endless series of class struggles between the oppressor and oppressed elements of society. This continuous conflict will end only when the highest "communist" stage of social development is reached where all personal property and wealth are abolished. This advancement to a greater social order can only be reached by a violent and "cleansing" break with the past social order, i.e., revolution. [Ref. 12: pp.48-53]

This economic explanation of historical forces was called "historical materialism" to distinguish it from the more prevalent idealistic philosophies of the mid-19th century. In contrast to the Hegelian belief of "all that is rational is real", the materialists believe that ideas are a mere reflection of the material world. In this sense materialists would today be called realists. A materialist view of human experience seeks to de-emphasize the importance of ideas, nationalism, and religion and accentuates the importance of human labor (surplus labor theory) and class struggle as social forces. What emerges from this analysis is a decidedly deterministic view of history that

sees the world advancing predictably through different economic stages to reach an ultimate advanced stage--utopian communism. Figure 4.1 depicts this postulated historical advancement.




Figure 4.1 Marxist Class Struggle Historical Progression

B. MARXIST-LENINIST REASONING--DIALECTIC MATERIALISM

Marxist-Leninists seek to explain human, historical, social, and even natural interactions by means of a reasoning process called "dialectic" thinking. Karl Marx (1818-1883) was first exposed to this thinking method by his teacher the German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831). Combining dialectic thinking with a materialistic view of the world, Marx used dialectical materialism as the philosophical basis for the doctrine of Communism in his Communist Manifesto published in 1848.

Essentially dialectic thinking describes progress and development as rising from the conflict of ideas or processes that are contradictions of each other. In describing class struggle, progress (termed synthesis), is a product of a conflict between opposites--a thesis and an anti-thesis. Figure 4.2 offers a conceptual aid in understanding the dialectic march toward progress.




Figure 4.2 The Dialectic Process

Marxists do not restrict use of the dialectic to social situations but find equal applicability in philosophy, history, science, and nature. So it is that in politics conflict between capitalists and workers leads to revolution and in nature the dialectic between positive and negative electron charges produces movement and power. To many non-Marxist observers the dialectic and dialectic materialism in particular are nothing more than an attempt to legitimize and give quasi-scientific status to Marxist views of the world:

Marxists are afraid that any philosophy of nature which is not materialist will entail a corresponding

explanation of history by other than purely material forces, and that if nature is not taken to be dialectical, neither can history be viewed as dialectically progressive. They therefore assert that historical materialism is inseparable from philosophic materialism, that dialectical materialism is identical with science, that the whole Marxist philosophy is, in Lenin's words, "as solid as a block of steel," and that "dialectics are the most generalized laws possible." [Ref. 12: p.58]

Soviet writings from medicine to philosophy faithfully note their conclusions as careful products of dialectic reasoning. There is evidence, however, that in many cases this may be ideological window dressing where actual results are obtained through commonly used western approaches to logic. [Ref. 12: p.58]. What is apparent is that much of the dialectic process becomes quite dogmatic with Marxist-Leninist acceptance an article of faith not dissimilar from many religious tenets. This of course is a direct refutation of dialectic materialism's avowed scientific basis. In the words of one critic:

"... the dialectic does not turn out to be a new logic or higher thought-form, a fruitful working hypothesis, the growth plan of the universe, the clue to history, an adequate description of nature, or anything else: instead it may be seen for what it is, a purely abstract formula, a kind of sheer scholasticism, or as some prefer to call it, sheer mysticism." [Ref. 12: p.54]

What dialectical materialism does permit is a thinking methodology that can validate and legitimize struggle, conflict, and social upheaval as natural to the human condition. If the utopian communist synthesis between capitalism (thesis) and the "worker's revolution" (antithesis) is ever to be reached, there must inevitably be a conflict between the two. Class struggle will end only when the last class enemy has been liquidated and by default there exists no other class to struggle with. Measures to exacerbate this conflict, i.e., revolution, terrorism, "just" socialist war, promote the advance of human progress and are desirable.

C. MARXISM AND MORALITY

As noted previously, morality, ethics, and the law are the superstructure which rests upon the current economic stage or foundation of a society. The moral code in force at any particular moment exists to serve and further the interests of the current ruling class. As best put by Trotsky:

All the social illusions which mankind has raved about in religion, poetry, morals, or philosophy served only the purpose of deceiving and blinding the oppressed
... [Ref. 13: p.88]

Those who are in the oppressed classes are duped and accept the ruling class concepts of rights and justice as their own. Morality and goodness are thus directly attributable to one's social class and period of history.

This logic has served as the basis for many of the purges and executions occurring in Marxist-Leninist societies. The interests of the working class are the highest form of morality while those of the oppressor are inherently immoral--"Morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society, to unite all the toilers around the proletariat."(Lenin, 1921) [Ref. 14: p.103]

This view of morality justifies a wide latitude of actions so long as the end result - revolution and Communism are achieved. By definition whatever the proletarian leadership, i.e., the CPSU, does in furtherance of the class struggle is therefore moral and just. As stated by Lenin:

"Dictatorship is rule based directly on force and unrestricted by any laws. The revolutionary Dictatorship of the Proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, rule that is unrestricted by any laws."(Lenin, 1920)
[Ref. 15: p.80]

This monopoly on morality coupled with the dialectic's sole grasp of the truth has made Marxist-Leninists

intolerable of Western practices of discussion and compromise. Why bother to discuss what is already factual? The analogy between religion again surfaces--seek the truth and you will be saved--resist or deny the truth and you will perish. Non-Marxist infidels are worthy of neither compassion or mercy as they are merely obstacles to the advancement of human development.

These philosophical concepts are not left to discussion but are touted as "guides to action." With near missionary zeal Marxist-Leninist values are taught from earliest childhood in all Marxist societies.¹⁰ Western thought if not branded propaganda is considered bourgeois and faulty because of its non-scientific, i.e., non-dialectic approach. True scientific thinking always subsumes dialectic reasoning.

The result of these unique political traits is a xenophobic society with a near messianic view of its mission in an "evil" world. The parallel with Tsarist Russia is clear. The CPSU viewpoint is not unlike that of the old Russian Orthodox Church where Moscow was the protector of the true faith and the "center" of the known "civilized" world.

D. LENINISM

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (1870-1924), known to the world as Lenin, is without a doubt the most influential man of the 20th century. It was he that molded western Marxism to Russia and served as the driving force behind the Bolshevik Communist Revolution of 1917. "Leninism" has become as important a force in world affairs as Christianity and Islam. It may well enjoy as many disciples worldwide.

¹⁰For a Soviet example of indoctrinating children from kindergarten through high school see Leon Goure, The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth, National Strategy Information Center, 1973.

The term Leninism refers to Lenin's adaptation of Marxist philosophy to the largely preindustrial conditions of early 20th century Russia. His ideas are contained in the many articles, pamphlets, books, and letters he wrote during his revolutionary years of 1893-1923. These are assembled in the 45 volumes of Lenin--Collected Works.¹¹ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) actively uses "Lenin's thoughts" to support and justify virtually the entirety of Soviet policy from agriculture and science to family and foreign relations. The closest Western parallel is to organized religion's use of biblical scripture to promote and legitimize religious and secular behavior. It is an interesting and probably natural development that the intolerant nature of the Tsarist Russian Orthodox Church has been supplanted by the equally intolerant and xenophobic quasi-religious practices of the Leninist CPSU.

1. The Theory of Imperialism

Lenin's contribution to Marxist theory was twofold. First he founded the "theory of imperialism." Second he established the communist party as the sole interpreter and agent of world change and progress.

The theory of imperialism expanded the application of Marxism and the class struggle beyond an internal struggle of the proletariat of the industrialized states to include underdeveloped nations and colonial territories. This widened the class struggle from a conflict of national scope to one of international proportions. Lenin characterized the final and highest stage of capitalism as "imperialism" where the capitalists of industrialized countries had expanded their control and exploitation to underdeveloped countries and colonies. These new found sources of wealth

¹¹This published collection is a source document for much modern Soviet writing on everything from family life to politics. See Lenin--Collected Works, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963.

had temporarily "bought off" the capitalist countries' proletariat who had also enjoyed some increased prosperity at the expense of the underdeveloped countries' workers. This respite would be short lived, however, and would inevitably lead to a rebellion of this new world proletariat against the capitalist rulers of the advanced states [Ref. 16: p.195]. Leninism thus evolved Marxism into a doctrine of international class struggle. This imperialism theory helped explain the colonial wars of Lenin's time and more importantly explained why the proletariat of the advanced capitalist states had not yet revolted as predicted by Marx. This talent of applying theory to practice was described by his wife Krupskaya:

To be able to study new situations and problems in the light of the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the world proletariat, to apply Marxist method to the analysis of new concrete situations--that is the special substance of Leninism. [Ref. 7: p.64]

This ability to adapt 19th century Marxist philosophy to 20th century conditions, has been credited by some with saving an essentially moribund philosophy [Ref. 7: p.55].

2. Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The other major contribution of Lenin was in his conception of the role of the Bolsheviks--the Communist Party--in "guiding" the state through creation of an elite "dictatorship of the proletariat". This dictatorship, the Party, would lead and direct the essentially backward proletariat in their revolutionary struggle. Unburdened by bourgeois law and morality, the Party would be the vanguard of the revolution to be used as a "class weapon" against opponents. It was this intensely self-righteous and missionary role imparted to the Party that set it apart from traditional western political practices:

The essential and distinctive quality of Leninism was the role that it assigned to the communist party. The moral attitude which Lenin passed on to the class-conscious Marxist--the attitude of a man with an insight and a mission--was far more that of a militant religious order than that which democratic parties associate with a political party. [Ref. 7: p.53]

E. LENINISM OPERATIONALIZED

The philosophy and policies espoused by Lenin have existed in the Soviet Union for nearly 70 years. The methods and tactics used to perpetuate communist rule and provide for world revolution have been molded into a strategy that has been remarkable for its staunch adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Patterns of Communist conduct or operational behavior have been analyzed by a number of scholars who have sought to understand Communist decision-making. One such scholar, Nathan Leites, has studied this operationalized CPSU behavior at the highest Soviet political levels.¹² We will review a selected portion of his findings to better understand the spirit of the Soviet Communist ideology.

1. Perception of Enemies

Every institution or group not controlled by the Party is an enemy or at least has the potential to become an enemy and must be treated accordingly. The only reliable friend or ally is that which is absolutely controlled, the concept of neutrality is not accepted. Ideas of autonomy or independence from party control are counterrevolutionary. The Party must be monolithic, insist on unanimity, and guard against attempts to infiltrate and unpurify it. These attitudes are summarized in Lenin's famous dictum "you are either with us or against us," there obviously being no middle ground.

¹²The following analysis is based on Nathan Leites discussion of the subject in A Study of Bolshevism, McGraw-Hill, 1953.

The leadership of the capitalist bourgeoisie ruling circles, share the same cunning, ruthlessness, and sense of purpose as the Party, albeit for opposing purposes. The "cold-bloodedness" used by Russia's foreign enemies must be reciprocated.

The Bolshevik characterizes both himself and the leader of the bourgeoisie as the ones who really "know", who perceive the hidden core behind the superficial or deceptive facade. [Ref. 14: p.381]

and also

Our reactionaries are distinguished by an extraordinary clarity of class consciousness. They know perfectly well what they want, where they go, on what forces they count. They are not half-hearted or undecided. . . . (Lenin, 1907) [Ref. 14: p.380]

The CPSU leadership thus "mirror images" much of their own political ruthlessness and conspiratorial behavior onto the leadership of the Western world. The congresses and parliaments of the West are seen as clubs for the rich or mere facades for the truly powerful who pull the strings covertly from the economic power centers of Wall Street and Fleet Street. The deceptive nature attributed to capitalists is portrayed in Stalin's observation of President Roosevelt's "New Deal" proposals:

The capitalists will say: presidents come and presidents go, but we go on forever: If this or that president does not protect our interests, we shall find another. What can the president oppose to the will of the capitalist class? (Stalin, 1934) [Ref. 14: p. 325]

The existence of a world-wide anti-communist conspiracy is assumed as is a "master plan" designed to encircle and destroy the communist state (this, of course, has become a self-fulfilled prophecy, largely do to overt Soviet aggressiveness). This underlying suspicion of

capitalist actions extends to the point that even overt displays of good feelings by the enemy can be categorized as either a means of deception; as a reward for betrayal; or as a grateful reaction to an incorrect Party position--one that threatens the Party's extinction [Ref. 14: p.402]. On the other hand, if Russia or the Party is verbally attacked or castigated by the capitalists then it is obviously doing the right thing.

This seemingly compulsive and exaggerated need for enemies is probably a combination of traditional Russian xenophobia and the tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Dialectical materialism sees historical progress rising out of the conflict and resulting synthesis of opposites. There must therefore always be an enemy to allow for progress. Acknowledgement of a neutral ground, an alternative course, is to obfuscate the dialectic process.

2. Survival of the Fittest

The threat and fear of extinction is a theme which permeates and drives much of the Leninist thought process. The capitalists main goal is to preserve the status quo and this can be achieved only by destroying the historical instrument of change--Communist Russia: "We know that their struggle to take advantage of every opportunity to attack Russia is incorrigible." (Lenin, 1920) [Ref. 14: p.406] and again

As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace: in the end one or the other will triumph--a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism. (Lenin, 1920) [Ref. 14: p.406]

The opposed and irreconcilable natures of these two systems means that conflict is inevitable and unavoidable. Though the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" has modified the means of achieving socialist victory somewhat (see page

53-54), the concept of continuous struggle and conflict remains a Communist catechism.

As struggle and conflict are inherent parts of the revolutionary process, it is important to establish the tactics necessary for socialist victory. In this regard, Leninist tactics are noteworthy for their determined insistence on victory at virtually any price. On the necessity of revolutionary violence Lenin said: "Not a single problem of the class struggle has ever been solved in history except by violence." (Lenin, 1918) [Ref. 14: p.358] Lenin also often liked to compare the process of revolution to that of childbirth--"out of the painful, bloody, and tormented act comes the beautiful child." The primary concern throughout is to preserve and perpetuate the Party which will serve as the catalyst for human progress. Everything, including morality, must be subordinate and expedient to this purpose. Indeed, this is the basis of Communist morality: "At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and consummation of Communism" (Lenin, 1921) [Ref. 14: p.103]

3. Leninist Peace

Western concepts of peace center around its positive connotations, that is not merely the absence of war or conflict but the active pursuit of goodwill among men, better relations and understandings between belligerents, and a general Christian spirit of friendship and harmony. [Ref. 17: pp.160-162] A decidedly different view is given to Soviet concepts of peace. As previously discussed, the history of man is seen as a continuing series of class struggles occurring according to the laws of dialectical materialism. This conflict of opposites will not end until the final synthesis--Communism is reached. This is the basis for a Leninist peace--the defeat and liquidation of the capitalist class enemy. One researcher has noted a striking

similarity between the actions of Lenin and the views espoused by the earlier Russian revolutionary (Narodnik) Peter L. Lavrov (1823-1900). In particular the latter's statements concerning both "peace" and the need to "spread peace" to surrounding countries:

There can be no peace between the new and the old orders. Wherever the social revolution may stop after the successes of the first moments, it must immediately, for its own defense, send messengers of the social revolution beyond its borders. It must immediately take offensive action by units sent further and further beyond the border, so that the territory of workers Russia on which the new structure of workers' socialism will rise, will not be surrounded by an area in a state of agitation and unrest. It must see that as far as possible beyond the borders of the new society the still undefeated enemy will be preoccupied with apprehension and internal disorders. [Ref. 17: p.29]

Soviet peace has many other hidden nuances that are at odds with common Western notions of peace. "Peace-loving" and "anti-imperialist" are synonymous and cannot be separated in the Soviet mind (in this sense "peace-loving" operates as a high context codeword that incorporates many other meanings to the Soviet reader). Under this mind-set it is perfectly permissible to engage in peaceful pursuits by undermining the capitalist social order, i.e. engage in terrorism, subversion, and even war. As one author has discovered even the definition of peace, in the Western sense of the word, is curiously missing from Soviet dictionaries and encyclopedias [Ref. 17: pp.168-169]. What is present are Leninist definitions of peaceful coexistence and "just" socialist war.

a. Peaceful Coexistence

The concept of peaceful coexistence first developed by Lenin to rationalize Russia's non-participation in WWI, was revitalized and reintroduced by Khrushchev at the 21st CPSU Congress in 1959. This was forced upon the Leninists by the advent of nuclear weaponry and the late

acknowledgement that growing numbers of these weapons made thermonuclear warfare a non-viable strategy. These weapons, even if introduced in a "just" socialist war, made possible the annihilation of both capitalist and socialist adversaries. In response to these changed conditions the CPSU proclaimed in 1959 that war was no longer absolutely inevitable. Instead the possibility of a "peaceful" victory by Communism was introduced with the seizure of power coming from a country's internal progressive forces. The Communist seizures of power in eastern Europe were given as examples of "peaceful surrender" by the bourgeoisie in the face of suicidal war.

Peaceful coexistence is a special form of struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. What we have to do, by clever policies on the part of the communist and worker's parties and the socialist camp under the leadership of the Soviet Union, is to achieve the maximum results for socialism in this struggle without causing the capitalist opponent to take to arms. (Khrushchev, 1960) [Ref. 18: p.34]

During the U.S.-Soviet detente of 1971-1976 Party secretary Brezhnev dropped all reference to peaceful coexistence as a "tactical" measure insisting that it was an important principle of a " . . . consistently peaceloving Soviet foreign policy." This "Program of Peace" put forth by the Party Secretary was not without some important caveats, however, as it further declared:

while consistently pursuing its policy of peace and friendship among nations, the Soviet Union will continue to conduct a resolute struggle against imperialism, and firmly rebuff the evil designs and subversions of aggressors. As in the past, we shall give undeviating support to the people's struggle for democracy, national liberation, and Socialism. [Ref. 19: pp.194-196]

Peace then is not "total" peace but a Leninist high context peace filled with caveats.

The Leninists thus demonstrate their flexibility in strategy and tactics by downgrading the inevitability of

a nuclear Armageddon involving the capitalist enemy. The nuclear age now makes this only a "possibility" that cannot be ruled out if the "correlation of forces" shift markedly to one side's favor. The traditional Leninist call for class struggle has never been changed. Indeed what has emerged is an increased emphasis in conducting economic, political, and "national liberation" wars to wear down the capitalist enemy.

b. Peace Treaties

One final note on the topic of peace concerns Soviet perceptions of treaties and negotiations. The asymmetries between Soviet and Western concepts of what constitutes a peace treaty is again quite revealing. To the West a peace treaty means a binding agreement, a contract to cease hostilities. Leninists on the other hand view treaties as a means of achieving markedly different purposes. First, a treaty can be used to obtain a temporary respite from a war that is going badly for your side: "A treaty is a means of gathering strength." (Lenin, 1918) [Ref. 17: p.170] Gathering strength until sufficient power exists to strike out again. Retreat in this sense is always preferable to annihilation. Temporary setbacks will not alter the charted course of history which is toward world communism. A second purpose is to codify gains or losses produced by the fighting. This was the tactic used by the Soviets in obtaining territory from Poland and Finland after World War II. [Ref. 17: pp.168-171]

The sanctity of treaty provisions exist only as long as one's forces need rest, then the struggle for a higher communist order must continue. This is a policy that is replete with 20th century examples, the most recent being the ill-fated U.S.-North Vietnamese Treaty of Paris "concluding" the Vietnam War.

F. SUMMARY

Marxist-Leninism is a very intolerant faith. The modern day Politburo act as "church elders" who seek to steer CPSU policies towards a communist "nirvana" in accordance with the word of Lenin. The theological basis for Politburo actions is "dialectical materialism" whose "scientific" constructs can explain and forecast the entirety of human and natural experience.

Though historical materialism has preordained the direction of human progress, it is necessary for the more politically astute--the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, i.e., the CPSU--to seize every opportunity and shorten the path of history. As the end result of CPSU actions will be good, expediency and direct action are called for. Sentimental questions of morality and truth are transient and irrelevant--the firewood of history.

The enemy--capitalism--will ferociously fight to the finish and will use every deception and tactic to postpone or alter historical progress. Any group not with the Party in this struggle is most likely against it. Peace and the easing of tensions in the world is not possible with two dialectically opposed political forces. Temporary codification of a "momentary relationship of forces" is possible with the enemy, but only if in the Party's interests.

While global nuclear war is currently not in the CPSU's interests, circumstances call for Soviet military vigilance to defend against or take advantage of a change in the correlation of forces. In the interim struggle must continue in the political, economic, and propaganda arenas to weaken the enemy.

V. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF WAR

"Our views on the essence of war and the views accepted in the capitalist states' doctrines are diametrically opposed."
Lieutenant General I. Zavyalov
Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 April 1973

We have previously noted the wide conceptual gulf that exists between our own Western view of morality, violence, and peace and that espoused by the practitioners of Marxism-Leninism. We now focus on the main thrust of this paper--the Soviet view of war.¹³

A. THE MARXIST-LENINIST VIEW OF WAR

Both Marx and Engels observed warfare in the context of the continental and colonial wars of the 19th century. For them it was easy to describe a class basis in the wars following the French Revolution of 1789. These wars were essentially battles between the old European monarchical order and the new nationalistic and eventually liberal, democratic traits embodied by the French Revolution and experimented with by Napoleon III. In these wars and insurrections Marx saw a justification for his theory of historical materialism and the advancement of humanity on the basis of struggle and conflict between opposing social classes. War, though undesirable, was seen as the natural and inevitable by-product of dialectic conflict between an old obsolete social order (monarchism) resistant to change and the new nationalistic, liberal, and democratic politics

¹³The following is based on Peter H. Vigor's discussion of the subject in The Soviet View on War, Peace, and Neutrality, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1975, pages 58-80 and Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) trans. U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government Press, 1974.

that were rapidly sweeping 19th century Europe (Marxists thus can approve of the Napoleonic Wars as being historically progressive in accelerating the demise of the old European aristocratic social order).

For Marx war was a socio-political phenomenon associated with the creation of private property and the resulting class structure of "haves" and "have-nots". Propertied exploiter classes (the haves) conducted organized warfare to achieve material gains and enhance their own economic and political power. [Ref. 20: p.6] As history and society progressed and the economic means of production changed, so did a society's (ruling class) views and methods for conducting wars. Under pre-monopolistic capitalism of the 19th century, the principle reasons for waging war was the accumulation of colonies as

sources of cheap raw materials and labor power, spheres for the export of goods and capital, strongholds on international trade routes. [Ref. 20: p.32]

Figure 5.1 shows a possible Marxist economic rationale for conducting wars.

The existence of war also gave the ruling classes the pretext they needed to establish large armed forces that could be used to subjugate the "exploited classes" in their own countries. The strike breaking use of troops in 19th century Britain, Germany, and the United States while purportedly concerned with maintaining law and order were thus seen as instruments of class repression. Even today a Western power's use of troops in student, race, or labor riots is given as proof of the counter-revolutionary use of troops to repress internal progressive forces.

In the Marxist view wars will continue to exist so long as there continues a class system in the world. The only way to abolish war is to create a classless society and by

<u>Historical Period</u>	<u>Economic Purpose</u>	<u>Example</u>
Slave Owning	accumulate slaves	Roman wars (200 B.C. - 100 A.D.)
Feudal	gain land, territory	War of Roses (1455-1485) Mongol-Russian wars (14th/15th century) Hundred Years War (1337-1453)
Pre-monopolistic Capitalism	increased markets, cheaper labor & resources	Seven Years War (1756-1763)
Imperialism (advanced capitalism)	gain territory, economic hegemony	Spanish-American War (1898) Russo-Japanese War (1905)

Figure 5.1 Marxist Economic Basis for War

definition this means a communist society. Herein lies the paradox. For while Marxists yearn to see a world free of war this can be accomplished only by eradicating the old exploiting class. As the existing bourgeoisie capitalistic ruling classes are unlikely to step down voluntarily, the likelihood of violence is ever present. Marxists thus cannot be pacifists for to do so is to deny the inevitability of class struggle and victory for communism.

1. War as a Revolutionary Catalyst

Lenin was also heavily influenced by the continental and colonial wars of the late 19th century and saw in them both a class basis and the economic battling between ruling powers for new resources and markets. This latter area helped him to develop his theory of imperialism (see pages 47-48).

For Lenin the first World War further demonstrated the greediness inherent in competing capitalist states. Probably just as important, however, World War I proved the utility of war as a force in causing social change. Lenin's October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution successfully used the stresses and strains brought on by war to topple the 1000 year rule of the Tsars. Far from disowning war, Marxist-Leninists thus see tremendous opportunity for revolutionary change and progress. Lenin's many calls for the proletariats of Britain, France, and Germany to stop World War I was not an expression of pacifism but rather an attempt to use the stress of war as a revolutionary catalyst. This strategy ultimately yielded results in Russia.

War can thus serve as a tool of revolution by exacerbating the internal conflicts and "contradictions" always present in a class society. It remains for the communist agitator and revolutionary to take advantage of these circumstances to advance revolution and the march toward utopian communism.

"Good" can come from the most terrible of wars. The communization of Russia, China, and eastern Europe are all "good" examples. Lenin displayed a communist's amoral (and self-justifying) objectivity on this point when he said:

"Some wars in history, for all their beastliness, have helped in the development of mankind, have destroyed the harmful or reactionary institutions such as absolutism or feudalism." (Lenin, 1915) [Ref. 17: p.18]

It is therefore not for purposes of peace that communists use anti-war slogans, take anti-war positions, and are active in anti-war movements but rather to foment stress, anxiety, and divisiveness within a society. The 1917 Leninist slogan "end the war" successfully promoted army desertions and eventually the collapse of all Tsarist power. More modern variations of this same theme should not be overlooked as to a possible similar underlying motivation and purpose.

a. Civil War

The fact that internal divisiveness may lead to civil war is of little concern, indeed it is to be promoted as a means of eradicating the last vestige of the "old" society. That many innocents may be killed or purposely liquidated is looked upon as a natural by-product of revolutionary change similar to evolutionary species extinctions that occur in nature. There is some evidence that Lenin actually sought the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920 as a means to employ extra-legal methods to totally liquidate, i.e. shoot, the now "obsolete" Russian class enemies brought on by communization [Ref. 17: pp.15-38]. The methodical, brutal killing and starvation of over 10 million Russians between 1918 and 1933, the estimated deaths of 30 million Chinese from 1945-1958, and the decimation of nearly half of the Cambodian population are all testimony to the ruthless thoroughness and efficiency of Marxist-Leninist class warfare.

2. War in the International Arena

The situation prior to 1917 was one where Marxists hoped to foment internal state revolutions on a worldwide scale utilizing war to destabilize the existing social orders. Heretofore wars had been a bourgeoisie capitalist manifestation with international competition and greediness as the main cause. The establishment in 1917 of a communist state in the world order called for new explanations on the nature and meaning of warfare.

As the new international champion and promoter of a communist classless society it was inevitable that Russia should attract the enmity and hatred of world capitalist circles. This was proven immediately after the revolution with the Western power's intervention of 1917-1918. Only by strengthening Soviet Russia could communism be assured of survival and serve to inspire the world proletariat. This Soviet mindset argued for an increased military orientation of industry. Stalin's great emphasis toward heavy military oriented industry (an effort that continues today) was the immediate outgrowth of these fears of capitalist encirclement and annihilation.

Out of this fear war became expanded beyond conflict between only capitalist states to include possible conflict between one communist and many capitalist states. War so conceived would therefore embody class struggle on an international scale. Soviet Russia, of course, would represent the forces of the downtrodden international proletariat. This bad guy--good guy view of the world has the Soviets promoting themselves as proletarian crusaders against the infidels of world capitalism. Any efforts to promote Soviet power thus serves to further the "moral and just" goals of a classless communist world order that will be free of class struggle and war.

3. Soviet View of Aggression and Self-Defense

Communist views of offense and defense are strictly tied to their ideological concept of class struggle. They differ markedly from Western notions. The right of self-defense can be assumed only if a series of Marxist-Leninist criteria are met.

First the aims or goals of the aggressor must be determined. If these goals are progressive, i.e., further revolutionary struggle or the weakening of capitalism, then the attacked party enjoys no right of self-defense (though it may still exercise it) as this obstructs historical progress. The right of Russia to defend itself against Nazi Germany is always maintained while the right of South Korea to defend itself against the progressive forces embodied in North Korea is vigorously denied. What is irrelevant is who started the aggression, the importance being in the class basis of the aggressor.

The other criteria is that all wars of territorial aggrandizement and plunder are by definition "reactionary" and hence qualify for legitimate self-defense. This criteria proves to be quite flexible and self-serving, however, when we note the Soviet annexations of the Baltic countries and Finnish territory immediately prior to World War II. These moves were justified as furthering the security of Russia and hence the viability of the world revolutionary struggle.

Lenin was even more direct than Marx and dispensed with classifying wars as either aggressive or defensive deciding instead to give full weight to the aims of the aggressor and benefits to the world revolutionary cause:

It is absurd once and for all to renounce participation in war in principle, on the other hand, it is also absurd to divide wars into aggressive and defensive. (Lenin, 1915) [Ref. 17: p.70]

and again after World War I:

The character of the war does not depend on who the attacker was, or in whose country the enemy is stationed; it depends on what class is waging the war, and on what politics the war is a continuation of. (Lenin, 1918) [Ref. 17: p.70]

From this Leninist logic it evolves that socialist countries inherently wage defensive wars as they are defending the proletariat and their struggle for a classless society. "Wars in defense of the socialist motherland . . . are unconditionally just." [Ref. 20: p.115] This is also true in internal situations of civil war where the proletariat seeks to defend its socialist gains. Aggression is not committed by beginning a war, but by obstructing historical progress. The aggressor is South Korea who seeks to thwart North Korea's progressive attempts to unify the country under one socialist government.

The corollary to the above communist viewpoint is that ethically or morally there is no disincentive not to attack first if by doing so one behaves in "defense" of the revolution. This may be the self-serving rationale that has been employed in the Russian invasions of Finland in 1939, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979.

This Orwellian "double-think" permeates much of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but it is certainly at its best when attempting to obfuscate and rationalize amoral Soviet behavior. In this sense it is not surprising that the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary declares that aggression can only be committed by "imperialist" states. By omission it must be assumed that socialist states always behave in a non-aggressive and defensive manner.

B. LENINIST CLASSIFICATION OF WARS

We have outlined the Leninist position that there can be two general types of wars, "good" wars that favor the class struggle and "bad" wars that hinder the progress of history.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia classifies the former as "progressive and just" and the latter as "reactionary and unjust."

Because Marxist history is divided into different social eras, the wars that accompanied these historical periods can also be classified based on their "socio-political" content.¹⁴ Figure 5.2 lists the different types of wars that can be described utilizing this Marxist-Leninist historical framework. The Soviets put World War II in a "special category" due to its "complex and contradictory" character. This is no doubt Aesopian language explaining that there are possible difficulties in justifying many Soviet war policies, particularly the pre-war treaty with Hitler. In addition to the wars displayed in Figure 5.2, a number of other kinds of wars are defined in Soviet military-political works. These are included in the following subparagraphs:

1. Wars of Territorial Aggrandizement, of Plunder, of Dynastic Ambition

These are unjust wars on the basis that they enrich and benefit only the exploiting class at the expense of the exploited. Though not listed under modern era wars it appears that some conflicts, e.g., the Iran-Iraq War may fall into this category. Though "unjust" these wars can prove to be progressive if they serve to advance the class struggle by toppling an oppressive regime or provide further impetus for revolution. The Soviet annexations of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were (self-servingly) not wars of this type but wars of "fraternal aid".

¹⁴the following classifications have been extracted from Peter H. Vigor The Soviet View of War, Peace, and Neutrality, and from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd edition, Macmillan, Inc.: New York, 1974 and from Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) trans. U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government Press, 1974, pages 69-97




Figure 5.2 An Historical-Materialist Classification of Wars

2. Wars between Capitalist States

These are the more "normal" types of wars. By definition socialist countries are excluded from this category. The "justness" of these wars must be determined on an individual basis as whether the cause of revolution is aided or not. World War I and World War II prior to Soviet entry fit this category.

3. Imperialist Wars

Under Lenin's teachings imperialism is the final stage of capitalism hence no further "progress" is possible under this system. This means that all of these wars are inherently "unjust." As this is the final stage of capitalism it is possible to foment internal revolution from these types of wars. The duty of a communist then is not only to oppose these wars as unjust but to heighten the internal stresses and crises that may precipitate revolution. The Vietnam War is the most recent example of this type war.

4. World Wars

These are battles between capitalism and socialism. It is always assumed that the capitalists will start these wars, and it is the Soviet's duty to "prevent the unleashing of these wars by the capitalists." To some analysts this requirement hints strongly of preemption. Though formerly thought of as the "final battle" it now appears that these wars may be fought for limited, i.e., not fundamental objectives. However if fundamental aims do become involved it is likely this conflict will escalate into global nuclear war.

A new world war will be a decisive clash between two opposed social systems A new world war will be a coalition war A third world war will be first of all a rocket nuclear war [Ref. 21: pp.237-239]

5. Colonial Wars

These wars are inherently unjust and reactionary. A recent example is the Falklands War where Argentina sought to "liberate" the islands from British colonial rule. Argentina's role was just according to Marxist-Leninist criteria.

6. Wars of National Liberation and National Wars

These are rebellions or insurgencies of a country against its foreign invaders or colonizers with the goal of achieving national independence. These occupiers must be either feudal or capitalistic in nature as the use of Soviet armed forces "in fraternal aid to socialist elements" does not qualify, e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. Internal rebellions against communist authority are always considered "counterrevolutionary." Examples of these wars include Algeria, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

7. Local Wars

These include both wars of the imperialist and liberation type. The term "local" being used to signify its relatively geographically isolated nature. The Soviets have given recent new emphasis to these types of wars as they feel increased Soviet power makes direct attack upon the Soviet Union less likely than before. Frustrated by this Soviet power, the imperialists will seek to thwart world revolutionary movements on the local level. The creation of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is probably interpreted as the establishment of a dedicated local war interventionist capability:

they [the imperialists] constantly resort to local wars, hoping with their help to slow down the development of the world revolutionary process. [Ref. 20: p.248]

8. Limited Wars

The use of this concept is limited to its Western meaning, to which the Soviets strongly disagree. The idea that a war can be strictly limited in scope when fundamental national issues are at stake is ludicrous to the Soviets. The idea of a limited nuclear war is not understood when all means must be utilized to ensure victory. The Soviets also disagree strongly with the idea of "escalation control" as they feel once started, nuclear weapon use will take on a momentum all its own.

9. Coalition Wars

The employment of multi-national forces, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in a capitalist--socialist conflict. If war should occur between these opposing class systems it will be a coalition war and likely nuclear.

10. Civil Wars

These wars can be either (1) wars between opposing members of the same exploiting class (e.g., U.S. Civil War) or wars between the exploiter and the exploited. The aims and effects of the latter types of wars are undeniably good. Though the aims of the type (1) civil wars may be unjust, the ultimate effect of the war (transition from feudalism to capitalism) may be progressive.

11. Revolutionary Wars

"A war waged by a revolutionary party for revolutionary purposes." "War in defense of the proletariat." Essentially any war fought to further the goals of a classless society. By definition then any war authorized by the CPSU constitutes a "just" revolutionary war.

12. Wars of Fraternal Aid

This is not a Soviet term but Peter Vigor's classification of the Leninist principle of fraternal aid in the

context of war. The Soviet's would never admit to having invaded or brought war to either Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Afghanistan. In keeping with their self-described defensive image they preferred to provide "fraternal aid" to these countries' progressive elements.

The most consistent trait found in the above Soviet classifications of war is that Soviet participation is always of a defensive nature and usually in reaction to capitalist aggression. This "imposition" of wars by capitalists can be triggered under very liberally interpreted circumstances as is shown in the following listing of "main aims the socialist states pursue in wars imposed by the capitalist aggressors": [Ref. 20: p.115]

- Defense of Socialism
- Defense of freedom and independence of all socialist states
- Assistance to other socialist states in rebuffing aggression
- Assistance to the working classes of capitalist countries, colonies, and young national states

Capitalists cause wars, socialists merely react to them. This mind set is carefully integrated into Soviet writings to the point that there is obviously a "party line" being followed, often on a word for word basis.¹⁵ When it becomes difficult to disguise overt Soviet military aggression, the phrase "fraternal aid" is used to camouflage Soviet actions. The presence in a country of even the smallest revolutionary group or disturbance can be used to justify Soviet intervention under this test.

¹⁵The most frequent example observed by this author has been the monotonous repetition of the phrase "a new world war, if the imperialists should unleash it, will be a coalition war involving a clash of the socialist and imperialist camps"

C. WAR AS A POLICY TOOL

Most students of the Soviet Union are well aware of Lenin's dictum: "War is a continuation of politics by violent means." This co-option of Clausewitz's original statement reflects both Lenin's personal agreement with Clausewitz's tenets on war and Lenin's acceptance and approval of their incorporation into the Soviet state ideology. Like most of Lenin's works the validity and utility of this statement is promoted in the most modern of Soviet military dissertations:

Politics is the reason and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political.
[Ref. 21: p.14]

Though it would be shocking to many sensitive Western ears, the use of war as a means of obtaining political objectives is openly advocated and accepted in Marxist-Leninist circles. We have previously repeatedly observed that exacerbation and continuation of the class struggle is an inevitable part of the historical process. War is merely the highest and most violent manifestation of this conflict. To deny war is similar to denying the pain that necessarily accompanies childbirth. The likelihood that war will erupt between the two opposing social classes--capitalism and socialism--cannot therefore be discounted and in fact is very probable. This last principle is deeply imbedded in Marxist-Leninist theory and will be hard to gloss over--detente and peaceful coexistence notwithstanding. This is certainly one reason the Soviet political leadership maintains and is able to justify a sizeable military establishment at the expense of Soviet consumerism, etc.

Does this mean that the Soviet Union will actively seek war? In this thermonuclear age the answer can only be no--unless they are assured of victory with minimal damage.

Leninists see war as one method, one tool in a large bag of strategic tricks that can be used to manipulate and direct the world toward ultimate socialist victory. If a political objective can be achieved by non-violent, peaceful means, i.e., negotiation, diplomacy, public pressure, then these less costly alternatives are to be used. Nevertheless war and most certainly the threat of war can be used concurrently with non-violent means to pressure an opponent. The key here is flexibility to the point of duplicity if necessary; the most important thing being the ultimate success of CPSU policy.

The policies followed by the Soviet Union in the Baltic countries and in eastern Europe resulted in their communization without resort to war. On the other hand, when diplomacy with Finland in 1939 failed to yield results, open aggression was successfully used to obtain the required territorial concessions. This carrot and stick, encouragement and coercive approach to diplomacy is reflected in the many seemingly incongruous approaches in Soviet foreign policy. Probably the most recent example has been the simultaneous use of diplomacy and a "peace offensive" coupled with thinly veiled threats in attempts to stop the U.S. Pershing/GLCM theater nuclear weapon deployments to Europe. The quick turnabouts in Soviet tactics, the combined use of "reasonable" public positions with occasional resort to threats are all in keeping with a long held Leninist strategy of favoring the immediate impact of statements over their substance or consistency.¹⁶

This unconventional (to Western eyes) and unnerving propaganda tactic has the additional benefit of forcing the opponent into a reactive position where he reacts to Soviet

¹⁶For more on Soviet negotiating tactics see Negotiating with the Russians, ed. Raymond Dennett, World Peace Foundation, 1951.

initiatives either out of hope or fear. The target population thus becomes manipulated and controlled by Soviet posturing and not by the substantive issues themselves. A good Leninist will seek to retain the initiative and be flexible for any immediate gain or advantage. This is illustrated by Lenin's 1918 advocacy of the World War I Treaty of Brest-Livotsk as only a temporary and expedient measure:

We must in no case, in not even a single strategic maneuver, tie our own hands . . . we must say that the party commissions the central committee to denounce all peace treaties and to declare war on every imperialist state and the whole world as soon as the Central Committee of the Party regards the moment as appropriate maneuvering. The peace treaty is merely a piece of live maneuvering. Either we stand on this viewpoint of maneuvering or we formally bind our hands in advance in such a fashion that we shall not be able to move. [Ref. 14: p. 53]

D. SUMMARY

The Marxist-Leninist view of the world requires the Soviet Union to see conflict and particularly war, in a manner unfamiliar to most Westerners. This view holds that conflict is natural to the present pre-communist human condition. Ideas of compromise or permanent peace with the very social system that causes war (capitalism) is tantamount to surrendering hope for progress and advancement to a better world condition under communism.

Soviet propaganda regularly notes the similarities and "common" ideological basis between Nazi Germany and modern American "imperialism". Who today would consider peace and compromise with Hitler to be a moral deed? Utilizing this type of rationale, the Soviet leadership can legitimize a wide range of Soviet diplomatic and military actions that would otherwise be seen as aggressive and destabilizing.

VI. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND SCIENCE

A. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military doctrine in the Soviet Union is a very different concept from that used in the United States. In the U.S. each service has a warfighting doctrine which describes the employment of forces to achieve military objectives. The Army and Air Force have a joint air-land battle doctrine called Air-Land Battle 2000 while the Navy has amphibious warfare and anti-submarine warfare doctrines. The use of this word is fairly free and covers the spectrum of conflict from strategic nuclear to guerrilla warfare. In this regard, the Air-Land Battle 2000 European theater warfighting doctrine better equates with the Soviet term "operational art" or that warfare occurring at the theater level. U.S. Navy amphibious and anti-submarine doctrines better match the Soviet idea of "tactics."

In the Soviet Union the term military doctrine has a very precise meaning that is carefully defined and controlled by the CPSU. As defined in the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, military doctrine is

A nations officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war. Military doctrine has two aspects: Political and military-technical. [Ref. 22: p.174]

and in another authoritative document

Military doctrine is worked out and determined by the political leadership of the state. [Ref. 23: p.109]

Military doctrine, then, is a political decision by the politburo on the nature of modern war and the preparations and methods for fighting it. It serves as the bridge between political strategy and the military force requirements necessary to implement this strategy. It is a long term futuristic framework that in the U.S. would be called "grand strategy" or national security policy. By nature it is a relatively stable program that once adopted by the Party leadership is not open to further discussion or debate.

The political side of military doctrine is concerned with the political objectives of a war, the allocation of state resources for the military, and the goals and missions assigned the armed forces. Military-technical questions concern the methods and strategies used in warfighting and the types of forces and weapons employed. [Ref. 24: p.74]

All other military-political decisions derive their basic guidance and rationale from this highest policy formulation which is based on Marxist-Leninist principles and the objective laws of military science. Figure 6.1 depicts these relationships. Soviet military doctrine thus has a heavy ideological flavor and can be assumed to faithfully mimic the Leninist concepts of war and peace that have previously been discussed.

1. Recurrent Themes in Soviet Military Doctrine

One researcher has attempted to identify the major doctrinal themes from Soviet political and military writings both public and restricted.¹⁷ Though lengthy, they are listed to illustrate the congruence and application of the aforementioned Marxist-Leninist concepts to modern Soviet military thought.

¹⁷The following listing is borrowed in whole from William T. Lee Themes and Topics from a Review of Military Thought, unpublished manuscript, October 1978 as quoted in John J. Dziak Soviet Perceptions of Military Power, Crane, Russak & Co., 1981 pages 27-28.




Figure 6.1 Relationship of Laws to Military Science

- Nuclear war, though dangerous and unpredictable, is a continuation of politics.
- Though war is not inevitable, a wide spectrum of conflicts between East and West is possible, and the USSR must be prepared for all of them.
- A nuclear war with the West would be "just" but the USSR is not presented as the initiator.
- A nuclear war would be a coalition war between the U.S./NATO and the USSR/Warsaw Pact, worldwide in scope, from which "socialism" would emerge victorious though damaged.
- A doctrinal modification undertaken in the mid-1960's allows for the possibility of a conventional phase in a superpower conflict in Europe and for conventional wars occurring elsewhere. However, escalation to tactical,

theater, and intercontinental nuclear exchanges from a conventional phase is highly likely.

- Military doctrine is by definition offensive, since such an approach is the most effective means to bring about the rapid defeat of the enemy.
- Should a war occur, overriding Soviet military objectives will be to: (1) deliver preemptive counterforce strikes to limit damage to the USSR; (2) insure surviving "reserves" for a second strike; (3) inflict total defeat on the enemy; and (4) occupy critical enemy territory. In the Soviet idiom, to "frustrate" and "repulse" an enemy attack connotes preemption and counterforce strikes and active and passive defense measures, all designed to destroy as much as possible of the enemy forces and limit damage to the USSR.
- The basic political goal in any war is victory. In nuclear war, victory means: (1) though damaged, the USSR continues to function politically, economically, and militarily after the initial exchange; (2) prosecution of the war continues until all enemy forces are destroyed or defeated; (3) Europe is occupied; (4) the USSR recovers in a reasonable time and Soviet-directed socialism prevails in the world.
- The USSR has no intention of conducting war termination negotiations with the government in power at the beginning of the war.
- Nuclear war may be short, concluding after a massive exchange. However, a protracted war is also possible, increasing the need for conventional forces to "secure" the victory.
- Nuclear weapons may be used selectively in a "battle-management" sense, especially to preserve European economic/industrial assets for subsequent Soviet exploitation. Nuclear weapons may be used to change the "correlation of forces" in one's favor in either preemption or retaliation; however, they are not used for "limited" or "demonstration" purposes in the Western sense.
- The objective of the CPSU's military equipment policy since the first Five Year Plan (1928) has been quantitative and qualitative technological superiority.

Figure 6.2 displays a sampling of these U.S.-Soviet asymmetries concerning war.

2. On Nuclear Weapons

As can be seen, nuclear weapons hold a special place in Soviet military doctrine and Soviet strategists give these weapons considerable weight in determining war outcome. This heavy emphasis has led many Western observers

<u>CONCEPT</u>	<u>U. S.</u>	<u>SOVIET</u>
war definition	political-military struggle	struggle between social systems
war start	avoid surprise	preempt
war prevention	deterrence, punishment	military and social preparedness
1st phase of war	conventional, limited nuclear	preempt enemy nukes strike in "rear"
conduct of war	escalation dominance	controlled chaos
psychology, attitude	emotional, war avoidance	science of war, a political tool
nuclear threshold	tripwire, limited nuclear response	uncontrollable momentum towards use
use of nuclear weapons	punishment	a "better" weapon

Figure 6.2 U.S. vs. Soviet Assymetries of War

to believe that the Soviets operate from a nuclear war-winning strategy [Ref. 25: pp.7-54]. This opinion is derived in part from the many Soviet scholarly military works (especially the Soviet Officer's Library series) that contain passages similar to the following:

Today's weapons make it possible to achieve strategic objectives very quickly. The very fast nuclear attack on the enemy may inflict such immense casualties and produce such vast destruction that his economic, moral-political and military capabilities will collapse, making it impossible for him to continue the struggle, and presenting him with the fact of defeat. [Ref. 20: p.12]

The fact that this idea is horrendous to Western ears serves to illustrate the great assymetries that exist between a liberal, democratic culture and that of a militaristic, totalitarian state. To the Soviets it would be ludicrous to deny themselves the use of the most powerful weapons if history demands the liquidation of the international class enemy. Military doctrine is thus offensive in character and unlimited in the means necessary to achieve

socialist victory (this possibly accounts for the reported use of outlawed chemical weapons by communists in both Cambodia and Afghanistan). The following passage from The Officer's Handbook disposes of the Western liberal concept of no victors in a nuclear war:

There is profound error and harm in the disorienting claims of bourgeois ideologues that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world war. The peoples of the world will put an end to imperialism, which is the cause of incalculable suffering. [Ref. 26: p.17]

Though the initial priorities assigned nuclear weapons are military targets, a broader target base is envisioned so as to insure the obliteration of the class enemy:

The objective of such a [world] war is not only the defeat of the enemy's armed forces but also disruption and destruction of the enemy's administrative-political and military-industrial centers, total disorganization of the enemy's rear areas. As a result of a colossal increase in the destructive capabilities of weapons, and particularly nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, during the course of war decisive strategic results are attained, which can very quickly and directly determine the outcome of the war and consequently the attainment of its main political goal. [Ref. 27: p.46]

The importance of attacking the enemy "rear" and those areas enumerated in "the objective laws of war" (see pages 83-88) is highlighted in the following passage which discusses the strategic goal of the actions of armed forces which

may be formulated as a task involving some degree of weakening or undermining the economic, moral-political and purely military potentials of an enemy coalition or country, as a result of which the enemy will be unable to continue the war in an organized manner. [Ref. 25: p.16]

Soviet military doctrine assumes, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, that the next major war will be a war to the end. Though the initial phases may be conventional, escalation control is impossible and the war

will quickly become nuclear. It is thus to the Soviet's advantage to build better and increasing numbers of weapons while seeking through various means to retard weapon development and acquisition by his enemy.

The Soviet drive for disarmament and banning of nuclear weapons can be seen as an attempt to disarm the opponent while retaining or gaining the decisive edge. The Soviet's can justify this seemingly inequitable bargain through use of the Marxist just/unjust war theory. If nuclear weapons are banned from only unjust wars this by definition leaves only the Soviet's with a nuclear monopoly! As stated by the Russian editor to Sokolovsky's Military Strategy:

As for the Soviet Union it has always resolutely opposed international agreements legalizing unjust wars. Our country is consistently struggling for general and complete disarmament. That is, for the destruction of all materials for waging such wars. (author's emphasis) [Ref. 28: p.14]

This explains why it is inherently immoral for the U.S. to have nuclear weapons, but not for the Soviet Union.

B. SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

Military science investigates the laws of strictly armed warfare, develops questions on the theory of military art, which comprises the basic content of military science, and questions of development and training of the armed forces and their military-technical outfitting, and also analyzes the military historical experience accumulated. [Ref. 29: p.56]

In the Soviet Union military science is considered as much a social science as history or sociology. Military officers regularly study and are awarded advanced degrees in this field. Many of these military scholars are employed in the Soviet counterparts to U.S. think tanks such as RAND and the Hudson institute. They also serve on various Soviet

international disarmament and negotiation committees.
[Ref. 24: pp.69-80]

The high prestige and academic status accorded these officers is a reflection of the importance given their role in the development of Soviet military-political theory and policy. The extensive research and publication of scholarly military affairs articles indicates the Soviets give heavy weight to the possible payoffs to be gained in studying and formulating military science. Figure 6.3 shows the relationship of Soviet Military Science to Marxist-Leninist thought and the armed forces [Ref. 24: p.71]. The most important part of military science is military art and its three main elements--strategy, operational art, and tactics.


1. Strategy

Strategy is the tool of military doctrine and is concerned with implementing the decisions embodied in that doctrine. Strategy also gives impetus to doctrine and is concerned primarily with conflict at the inter-theater and global levels [Ref. 24: p.74]. There are two sides to strategy: the theoretical and the applied.

The theoretical side covers principles of strategy and addresses the theoretical basis for war plan development. In the U.S. this would probably include such theories as flexible response, counterforce, countervalue, etc. These principles are formulated in accordance with the objective laws of war (see pages 83-86). The applied side formulates and probably exercises actual war plan development, also according to the laws of war.

2. Operational Art

Operational Art is concerned with developing combat principles for waging battle at the theater level. As such it is heavily influenced by the need to develop principles for combined arms operations. Each of the five Soviet services--the Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Ground Forces,



ADAPTED FROM G. AOSTEV, "ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THEORIES OF THE NAVY," MOHEVOY SPOBNE 11, 1984, P. 26.

Figure 6.3 Principles of Military Science

the Troops of the National Air Defense, the Air Forces, and the Navy all have their own operational art [Ref. 24: p.70]. This is essentially a service's way of conducting the business of war similar to how the U.S. Air Force and Army interact in Europe under Air-Land Battle 2000. The major difference is that Soviet operational art will always seek to follow the objective laws of war when developing its operational plan.

3. Tactics

Tactics applies to division level operations or smaller. These can be further broken down into infantry tactics, armor tactics, air defense tactics, etc. The meaning of tactics to American and Soviet officers is nearly identical.

An important feature of Soviet Military Science that must be appreciated by the West is that the Soviets see the study of war as a control problem more than a leadership problem. While Western readers read of the combat genius of an Eisenhower, MacArthur, or Nimitz, Soviet researchers are more interested in discovering the common laws or themes of control that led to these commander's success. Warfare and the science of war thus becomes essentially the problem and science of control. This is a partial explanation for the great Soviet interest in cybernetics (the science of control and control systems), especially in military circles.¹⁸

C. THE LAWS OF WAR

The application of scientific socialism to the social phenomena of war enables Marxist-Leninists to better explain the underlying basis or truths that are necessary to achieve victory in the class struggle. The formulation and study of these laws of war are a very important part of Soviet military science. These laws of war are defined as:

The substantial, recurrent, and inseparable associations which are organically inherent in war, and which determine its conduct, course, and outcome. [Ref. 22: p.138]

¹⁸For more on this cybernetic connection with Soviet society, see James G. Taylor "Initial Concepts of Soviet Control", unpublished manuscript, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 1985.

The Soviets insist that these laws are objective and therefore apply equally to capitalist and socialist forces. The fact that the West is somewhat oblivious to these principles is attributed to the unscientific basis of the bourgeois capitalist culture. Foreign graduates of the Soviet Frunze Military Academy and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy indicate there is a general disdain and even arrogance toward the "old, outmoded" Western approach to military strategy and tactics.¹⁹

These laws are of two types, (1) general laws, which apply to basic strategy and doctrine and (2) laws of armed conflict, which are more specific in scope. The general laws of war quoted below are found in Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army and Principles of Operational Art both part of the Soviet "Officers Library" military studies series. Five of the more important of these general laws are listed hierarchly as follows:

1. The Course and Outcome of Wars are Dependent on Their Political Aims

This is directly related to the previous discussion of the different types of wars, e.g., imperialist, just or unjust. The outcome of an imperialist war always favors the anti-imperialist though this in itself does not ensure victory. Thus communists inherently carry an advantage in war. The other part of this law points to the intensity of the conflict, for wars of only marginal impact on a country's interests are likely to be less violent than either civil wars or wars between opposing social systems. For example, if United States survival had been the issue in Vietnam, its intensity and outcome may have been quite different.

¹⁹As presented by Afghan Army officer defectors to the "Soviet Operations Research" class at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., August 1985.

2. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent on the Economic Potential of the Warring Sides

Consistent with emphasizing the economic basis of historical development, Soviet theoreticians also assert that the outcome of a war is heavily dependent on the production capabilities, industrial base, and overall economic wealth of a country relative to its enemy. The tremendous industrial capacity of the United States was unquestionably a major factor in the Allied defeat of Axis powers in World War II. This economic potential is reflected both in the quantity and quality of weapons produced, the reserves of material and food supplies, and the ability to gear up and replace war losses.

This latter area is probably less important in the nuclear age as the surprise and scale of conflict will make this a "come as you are" war. The ability of modern rocket weapons to strike deep into the enemy's rear areas, i.e. his industrial base, further heightens the importance of reserves and stockpiles in today's warfare. This may account for the reported huge stockpiles of food and warehoused tanks and other war materials in the Soviet Union. It may also explain the propaganda efforts exhorting the Soviet population to "catch up and overtake" Western and especially U.S. industrial production. Economic power can yield to the Soviets both significant propaganda benefits and the potential for political and military hegemony.

3. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent on the Scientific Potential of the Warring Sides

This law gives weight to the potential for development of revolutionary new weapons such as occurred with nuclear devices. The Soviets are mindful of the immense strategic nuclear dominance enjoyed by the United States from 1945 to the late 1960s. The strength of a nation's scientific research and development base can prevent technological surprise and more importantly strive to achieve it.

Modern technology is currently the driving force behind advances in military computer applications, micro-electronic circuitry, and directed-energy weapons among others. If for example, the Soviets were to first deploy an operational anti-ballistic missile directed-energy weapon, the impact on U.S. strategic weapons, and by implication deterrence, would be significant. The importance given this law accounts for the strenuous Soviet efforts to acquire Western technology (technology transfer) and also Soviet efforts to control or halt certain U.S. exploratory research, e.g., the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The emphasis given to this law of war and corresponding Soviet direction of resources is certain to increase as we move further into the era of science and technology.

4. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent upon the Correlation of Moral-Political and Psychological Capabilities

This can simply be termed the national will to prevail in war. It is an amalgam of the political aim of a war, the will for national survival, and old-fashioned patriotism. In a methodical campaign that would shock many sensitive Western "peace movement" members, the Soviets have systematically indoctrinated and prepared their population for nuclear war:

The moral-political preparation of the people for war is accomplished under direction of the Communist Party . . . The political-moral preparation of the Soviet people for war consists mainly in educating them in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, love of country and the Communist Party, and teaching them to be ready to suffer any hardships of war for the purpose of achieving victory.
[Ref. 21: p.329]

This preparation runs the gamut from the near incessant deification and glorification of the Soviet sacrifices of World War II to officially sanctioned "hate America" campaigns. The spectrum and intensity of this psychological preparation is incomprehensible to Westerners but it is a

very real and documented fact of Soviet life.²⁹

World War II demonstrated the importance "the rear" could bear on fighting on "the front". The Soviets evidently feel "the rear" and both civilian and military morale will be of equal or more importance in the thermonuclear age.

Conviction as to the justness of a war and recognition of the necessity to sacrifice one's life for the good of one's brothers raises the spirit of soldiers and forces them to bear unprecedented hardships. [Ref. 29: p.93]

5. The Course and Outcome of War are Dependent upon the Relationship of the Military Forces of the Belligerent Sides

This law pertains to what in the U.S. would be termed "combat readiness." This is the first priority in U.S. military strategy but only the fifth in the Soviet hierarchy of war. The reason for this is not that the Soviets attach any less importance to combat readiness, but that they see war, especially a prolonged modern nuclear conflict, as involving elements of much broader scope, i.e., economic, scientific potential, stockpiles and reserves, and national will. Certainly the experience of Vietnam as shown that strength or combat potential of military forces is of little help if the political aims and national will are questionable. All things being the same, however, military strength can overcome an enemy and is important. This combat potential covers the totality of readiness from size of forces, mobility, and firepower, to reserve force and mobilization capabilities.

The foregoing Soviet laws of war address not only the importance of military strength to warfighting but the criticality of economic, political, and social factors in

²⁹For more on the Soviet psychological and social profile see Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, Greenwood Press, 1951.

achieving victory. The hierarchical listing of these factors would indicate that military strength alone is not decisive in war. Wartime does not begin with the opening cannon shot, but with years of preparing and building the economic, scientific, and social infrastructures.

D. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT

A subset of the objective laws of war are the laws of armed conflict:²¹

The laws of armed conflict are the deep internal, essential, necessary, stable, repetitious ties and relationships among phenomena of military operations or their attributes which are manifested on battlefields in the course of armed conflict itself. [Ref. 29: p.56]

These laws apply strictly to military actions at the theater level and below and are based on the study and analysis of past military campaigns. Unlike their Western counterparts, the Soviets support sizeable ongoing statistical analyses of historical military campaigns seeking to establish common themes or actions that led to either victory or defeat. These principles provide guidelines and norms for future military action and are probably tested extensively in Soviet wargames and exercises prior to incorporation into operational warplans. From these studies the following partial list of guiding principles has emerged:

1. The Law of Dependence of Methods of Armed Combat on the Means of Its Waging

This law says that the type of weapons employed in a conflict can be decisive. The side that employs rifles will probably win out over those using bows and arrows. The same

²¹The following "laws of armed combat" were extracted from Harriet F. and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, and I. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971) trans. U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government Press, 1971.

holds true for nuclear versus conventional weapons. The importance of logistics and training in support of armed combat is a corollary to this law.

2. The Law of Cooperation of Troops According to Place, Time, and Goal

This is largely the combined arms issue of coordinating air, artillery, and troop attack for maximum effectiveness. This also has application in the modern age of coordinated cruise and ballistic missile attack where each side seeks to saturate and overwhelm an enemy's defenses.

3. The Law of Dependence of Combat Action on Conformity of the Character or Control to the Arms and Means of Armed Combat

This pertains to the commander's ability to correctly appraise the combat situation and issue directives that will correctly control its desired outcome. This in essence is a problem of command and control.

4. The Law of Dependence of Victory in Armed Combat on Concentrating Basic Forces in the Decisive Direction

This is the age old problem of concentrating maximum forces on the decisive point of the battlefield at the critical time.

The aggregate of these "laws of armed conflict" is the overall "combat might" of a force. The force that enjoys the best weapons, logistics, plan, and commanders will likely prevail in combat. Though most Western commanders would no doubt agree with the validity of these findings, it is unlikely that many have undertaken the extensive historical and analytical studies required in Soviet military academies.

The Soviets put great emphasis on understanding these combat norms and principles. The intent is to exercise and provide commanders with guidelines that will prove useful in the unregulated chaos of war. Rather than being passive or merely reactive to the chance events of war, the Soviets seek to tilt these probabilities in their favor:

A considerable degree of regulation of the process of armed conflict may be achieved only by those commanders who possess the moral-psychological qualities, a deep knowledge of the laws of warfare and armed conflict, an ability to carry out in practice the principles of military art based on the concrete situation, and a capability to foresee a majority of chance phenomena and influence them in a timely and intelligent manner.
[Ref. 29: p.60]

Though Marxism-Leninism may of itself be suspect as a legitimate science, it has spawned an extensive and creative scientific study of warfare that leads many Soviet senior officers to believe that they enjoy a sizeable advantage over their Western enemy.

E. SUMMARY

The Soviets are quite dedicated to annihilating their international class enemies. A fatalistic, deterministic view of the world social order gives primacy to the "inevitability" of conflict, including war. This in turn has given rise to a society that is increasingly militaristic in orientation. The Soviet Union operationalizes this political viewpoint in a military doctrine which mobilizes and directs national resources toward long established political goals. Far from disavowing nuclear weapons or war, the Soviets have incorporated the military advantages and changes they bring into their military doctrine and science. They do this while simultaneously advocating Western divestiture of these "immoral" weapons.

The ideological requirement for "scientific substantiation" has promoted the development and growth of an entire science of military thought in the Soviet Union. Unlike many Western countries, the Soviet Union holds both military science and its scientists (e.g., military officers) in high esteem for they may be the agents affecting social "development" in the world. The "objective laws" discovered in military science give a "high context" portrayal of future military conflict. Indeed, many of its tenets (demoralizing

the Western "rear") may already be in operation. A nation's national security infrastructure (the "rear") is as important and potentially decisive in future conflict as are its armed forces.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

"The American people have only themselves to blame because they lack the stamina to stay the course against the Russians who are 'Sparta to our Athens'."

Henry Kissinger, 28 November 1970
as quoted by Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
in On Watch-A Memoir, N.Y. Times
Book Co., 1977

A. OVERVIEW

Soviet concepts of war have developed out of the Russian political culture. This culture is deeply based in Russian history and modern Marxist-Leninist ideology. Russian history has been dominated by the issue of survival in a hostile and unforgiving world. Survival in this environment has made the Russian rely heavily on his immediate circle of friends--his mir--for support and sustenance. Even then trust has been a precious commodity to be rationed very carefully, for weakness and vulnerability has meant near certain death. Concerned with such mundane issues as food and protection from human and natural adversity, Russian society has accepted harsh and often despotic rule as necessary to achieve the cohesiveness and unity required to meet the threats to survival. A ruling elite has risen that reflects the same "fortress mentality" and secrecy of the mir. This has resulted in Russian isolation from significant political and philosophical revolutions, notably the Reformation and Renaissance, which greatly affected and liberalized Western political culture.

The impact of the Byzantine church was equally significant in isolating Russia and accelerating the drive toward absolutism. The Russian Orthodox Church's claim as the true

seat of Christianity and the new "Third Rome" gave rise to a xenophobia that both rejected foreign influences and gave rise to increased Soviet power. Deriving power and legitimacy directly from God, the Tsars saw themselves in a fatherly messianic role with the Russian state and people as their property and children. The population became passive and apolitical as guidance and authority was always given from above. The Tsar and his supporting bureaucracy sought to eliminate any competing and potential moderating sources of power. The result was a firmly entrenched Moscow elite that sought to protect its position through a very conservative and autocratic style of government.

History has taught the Russians that outsiders and foreigners are not to be trusted. The long history of invasion and war has shown that peace is obtainable only through strong armies and expanded frontiers--to the point that pre-emptive attack or armed intervention in a bordering state is justified if they present a threat. Control or domination of bordering countries has thus long been central to Russian ideas of security. War has also broken the "myth" of Western humanitarianism and liberalism. The barbarism and ruthlessness of Hitler's armies were seen as confirmation of the cruelty and devastation to be expected from the West. This message is still communicated today through the ongoing propaganda campaigns surrounding World War II.

The Russian legacy thus teaches that the West has little to offer and that peace is best achieved on one's own terms. Concepts of compromise are alien to a culture that has traditionally seen itself as the citadel of Truth and center of the civilized world. A strong "patrimonial" elite has seen its role as preserving its own position of power while directing a politically lethargic population.

This political legacy continues under Marxist-Leninist rule. The 1917 October revolution while ending Tsarist rule, preserved and even heightened Russian xenophobic and messianic tendencies. It did this through the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism which rejected the capitalistic and accompanying liberal-democratic movements dominating most of Europe. A philosophic body of thought was established that cast itself as arbiter of truth and the spearhead of human progress. This philosophy became the first theory of man to explain everything from biology to politics. The world became predictable if man could only decipher the scientific laws or keys to its operation.

The new Bolshevik ruling elite adopted these viewpoints while systematically eliminating any counterrevolutionary liberal-democratic Russian tendencies and proponents. Through the purification ritual of the purges the Soviet Communist Party became as monolithic and orthodox as its religious Russian Orthodox predecessor.

The success of the October 1917 Revolution taught the Bolsheviks the virtues of being bold and seizing power when the situation presented itself. The Russian Civil War (1918-1920) and internal Party struggles have also proven the utility of an "end justifies the means" moral code where any action is acceptable if it promotes the power and elitest position of the Party. Threats to the Party (including populations) can legally be liquidated under this mindset. Violence is therefore not necessarily bad as it can create the opportunity for revolution and change.

This new communist ethic rejects Western concepts of "fair play" and compromise. Responding to the messianic call for world revolution, Marxist-Leninists can justify a wide range of actions if advancement down the historical path toward communism is furthered. This manifests itself in an expedient attitude toward Western held values such as peace

and sanctity of life. These values are only superficial and tied to the current social class in power. Because a social class becomes obsolete and expendable as history progresses so are its current beliefs and values seen as only transitory.

The Marxist-Leninist state ideology also serves as the modi operandi for political action and relations with other nations. These nations are either with the revolution or against it. Those countries that follow the CPSU's leadership down the path of communism can expect peace. Those countries that seek to thwart historical progress or undermine revolution risk eternal conflict, domestically and externally, until they are toppled. War is always a manifestation of class conflicts that are irreconcilable. It is a "sacred duty" of the CPSU and other socialist powers to support oppressed peoples in their class struggles. As conflict in the world is unavoidable, the CPSU must prepare for any eventuality, including nuclear war. Nuclear war though revolutionary to methods of warfare has not changed the nature of warfare which is politics. Wars which promote CPSU progressive policies are just wars, those which do not are unjust and immoral.

Both Tsarist and modern Soviet society are "high context" societies in that they rely heavily on implicit "hidden meanings" and programming in societal communications. To understand all of what is said in Marxist-Leninist Russia means to be conversant in Russian history, culture, language and ideology. Words that appear innocuous to the outsider are ripe with meaning to the native Soviet. Codewords such as just war, imperialist war, aggression, and defense evoke a series of qualifications and connotations understandable only by an individual raised and "programmed" for years in the Soviet culture. This facet of Soviet culture can present intelligence analysis problems for the West.

This high context view of the world carries into the Soviet view of war. War between competing social systems involves more than conflict on the military-political level. Efforts to weaken and undermine the enemy social order must involve attacks on the entirety of his political, economic, scientific, and moral-psychological capabilities. These efforts to weaken the enemy are initiated prior to military attack. Efforts must likewise be taken to strengthen Soviet potentials in these areas. The importance of moral-psychological resilience was demonstrated during World War II. Modern nuclear "come as you are" warfare makes this and the other objective laws of war even more important today.

When coalition war does come or as the Soviets say "When war is forced upon us," there can be no measure of compromise or substitute for total victory. Victory will not occur with the final battlefield defeat of the enemy but with the liquidation of the last class enemy:

the Soviet language of war does not begin where the American does, with a breach of legality, or end where it does with a military defeat. It begins with the exacerbation of class warfare (which emerges often as the warfare of political parties) and ends with nothing less than the transformation of society. The last Soviet battle does not take place when the missiles have ceased to fly, but when the revolutionary executions against the wall have stopped. [Ref. 31: p.31]

B. IMPACT OF SOVIET ASSYMETRIES

The West, and the American public in particular, appear ignorant of the nature of the Soviet threat. They know that somehow Russia is the enemy, but they are oblivious to the cultural and ideological asymmetries that make for this situation. They are certainly unaware that conflict preparatory to war may already be taking place on the economic, scientific, and psychological-moral levels. This is undoubtedly the Soviet view.

My purpose in this thesis has been to provide a sampling of Soviet viewpoints, especially on war, that demonstrate the great asymmetries that exist between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I have shown that to the Soviets the "cold war" is a natural outgrowth of the current world socio-political confrontation between capitalist and socialist systems. To the Soviets the "Cold War" existed long before the post-World War II tensions of Berlin and Korea. Soviet preparation for the annihilation of its international class enemies began soon after the Soviets consolidated their power in 1922. With the exception of World War II, a continuous state of political, economic, and ideological war has existed since that time. The massive heavy industrialization undertaken by Stalin was probably as much an attempt to prepare for the inevitable class showdown as anything else. The formulation and ideological requirement to adhere to the "objective laws" of warfare also explains the Soviet's current reluctance to engage in extensive consumer oriented production at the expense of the armaments industry. From the Soviet standpoint, consumer goods and a higher standard of living are secondary to establishing overwhelming military and economic power and the psychological-political advantages this brings. The Soviets have opted for the "guns" side of the "guns and butter" decision as they are locked in a final battle with capitalism.

What is also readily apparent is that the Soviet laws of war reflect the same broad and encompassing view of social conflict as that espoused by Karl Marx. If conflict occurs across the entirety of the social, economic, and political spectrums then one should prepare accordingly in each of these areas. This is exactly what the Soviets have done. They have established a high context view of war that occurs at all levels while the U.S. and the West continue to view war as strictly a military-political struggle. From the

Soviet perspective, they have adopted a systems approach to warfare involving systematic efforts to disrupt Western political processes, destabilize the international economy, and acquire or retard Western scientific gains. The use of armed force is as a last recourse when the enemy has been so weakened that victory is assured.

I have also shown that the Russian political legacy of xenophobia and self-righteousness makes the likelihood of Soviet fidelity to international peace organizations such as the United Nations questionable at best. The Soviets will not acknowledge that a compromise or middle ground exists, they will always seek to steer negotiations and organizations they can influence toward Marxist-Leninist "objective reality", i.e., Soviet interpretations of events. In this regard, Soviet use of arms negotiations and "peace offensives" fit in well with the antithesis of the "law of relationship of moral-political and psychological forces". If good morale and correct psychological attitude can win a war, cannot the reverse help defeat an enemy? Many commentators have long suspected the Soviet's penchant for raising expectations for peace, then threatening war, followed by accusatory characterizations of Western motives, are all designed to disrupt and demoralize the Western body politic's will to resist. Current European trends toward neutrality, pacifism, and a "better Red than dead" mentality may be the results of a deliberate Soviet strategy based on this law of war. If Soviet objectives of European domination can be achieved without resort to war, this is much preferable to risking thermonuclear destruction of the Soviet homeland.

Military power does not necessarily have to be used. It is not "use it or lose it" prospect. The Soviets see military power as "money in the bank" that can be used to pressure and direct an opponent toward a desired goal. Military

force is thus only one tool in the Soviet strategic toolbox and its use will not be in response to some emotional provocation but as the result of a carefully deliberated political decision. The Soviets would much rather peacefully occupy Europe than have to fight for it. As Raymond Garthoff has observed:

War is not the goal of Soviet (political) strategy; the Soviets prefer to gain their objectives by peaceful means--by forcing appeasement on the enemy. This consideration holds a significant place in Soviet strategy, which judges the long term trends and possibilities in determining what risks are worth taking in the short run. [Ref. 32: p.11]

This latter point holds some seeds of hope, by virtue that the Soviets are unlikely to react emotionally to events or provocations. Instead they are more likely to carefully assess the gains to be made from a given situation against any probable losses and act accordingly. This appeared to be their decisionmaking methodology during the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, one Soviet fear of the West, and of the U.S. in particular, surrounds our unpredictable and often emotional response to crisis (see Khrushchev Remembers). Always seeking a "scientific" analysis of the "correlation of forces," the Soviets will probably be very cautious in the use of military force.

C. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The West is faced with an enemy few understand. In this author's experience this is reflected in the tendency of American military officers to mirror image American concepts of war onto their Soviet counterparts. This is an ill-advised and dangerous practice that will continue as long as there exists a lack of knowledge on the Soviets. All too often military officers receive advanced (primarily technical) education without understanding the military-strategic basis for its undertaking. This ignorance can lead

to miscalculation and surprise--and with these errors the danger of catastrophic war.

For American policymakers and military officers it is especially important to appreciate the Soviet view of war. What is required is a continuum of officer education on the nature of the Soviet enemy--his philosophy, his methods, and his art of war. While this education does occur for those few senior officers assigned to war colleges, it is imperative that this exposure begin much earlier--at the officer entry level--and continue throughout his career. This education should begin with a one quarter or semester length course at the military academies, ROTC, OCS, etc. This initial exposure could be followed up through Department of Defense sponsorship of a monthly periodical on the subject. This would further stimulate academic interest and study of the Soviet view of war. Similar to how the military's drug education and prevention efforts have spilled over into the civilian world, these DOD sponsored efforts could cause an upsurge in public awareness and education on the Soviet Union. An educated public would be more aware and responsive to U.S. measures to deal with the Soviet threat.

Another effort in this direction would be the establishment of postgraduate level study in military science. These courses would educate military officers in the nature of modern warfare, strategy, and tactics. This would give impetus to the creation of a cadre of military PhD officers fully versed in formulating and implementing U.S. military strategy. These officers could form the nucleus of the JCS Staff Corps bantered about in Congress. A model for this program of study exists in the Soviet Voroshilov General Staff Academy. Here military officers pursue advanced military science degrees and find subsequent utilization in the Soviet General Staff or in Soviet "think tanks" that deal with the "enemy", e.g., the Institute of the U.S.A. and

Canada. The U.S. needs to get serious in this regard and develop more strategists conversant in Soviet and U.S. doctrine and strategy.

Study and mastery of the Russian language should also be encouraged by DOD so that our officers are conversant and can read original Russian texts. This would assist in alleviating the problems inherent in loose or "watered down" translations, and hidden contextual meanings and "code-words". The recent DOD recommendation for proficiency pay for foreign language mastery is a step in the right direction.

D. SUMMARY

The Soviets view the world from a perspective remarkably alien to that of the West. It is important that these differences be understood by the Western body politic in general, but certainly by those policymakers and military officers charged with its defense. Analysis of Soviet political and military intentions must be made keeping these asymmetries in mind, otherwise we risk defeat in achieving U.S. objectives--be it at the negotiating table or on the battlefield. Counter-strategies and counter-tactics can be developed only if we know what we are countering. The implications are equally ominous on the more specific military systems level. Here the attractiveness of Soviet pre-emption ("frustrating" the "imperialist's" attack) is an area that deserves immediate attention in the design of survivable U.S. Command and Control. Again, these and other military design issues are best understood if the nature of the Soviet threat is fully understood. This thesis has been an attempt in that direction. Much more needs to be done in the future.

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